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The Palestinian women's movement in the Occupied Territories has emerged as
an undeniable force on the domestic political scene over the past thirty years. During the
Intifada, women seized the opportunity to demonstrate their significance as participants
in the struggle for national independence through socio-political organizations that had
been developing since the 1970s. Today, these organizations provide a platform from
which women address issues beyond those concerned with Palestinian statehood,
challenging existing societal norms regarding the rights ofwomen.
Beyond the argument that women comprise roughly half of the world's
population, there lies a need for comparative studies of women's movements as a viable
political force. The politicization of the gender issue in many developing countries is a
cause for great concern. The ability of women as a social group to generate support and
potentially impact the political infrastructure has gained attention as a vehicle to induce
regime change. I contend that when women are given the opportunity to pursue
university education, a generation of well-educated, professional women amasses over
time. These women have the ability to generate the strength to sustain a feminist
movement in parallel to, yet independent of, a national movement, as evidenced in the
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Palestinian women's movement in the Occupied Territories has emerged as
an undeniable force on the domestic political scene over the past thirty years. During the
Intifada, women seized the opportunity to demonstrate their significance as participants
in the struggle for national independence through socio-political organizations that had
been developing since the 1970s. Today, these organizations provide a platform from
which women address issues beyond those concerned solely with Palestinian statehood,
challenging existing societal norms regarding the rights ofwomen.
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is: If and when the Palestinians
gain their independence, how will the regime's political composition affect the current
women's movement in the new state? A spectrum of possibilities exists, ranging from
expansion to suppression or even to termination. In other words, the government could
choose to allow women's groups to continue business as usual, pursuing their agendas
such as legal reform and political participation with little interference. Conversely, the
administration may decide to disband the organizations if they are thought to pose a
threat to internal stability and cultural norms. Between these two extremes lies a range of
responses, and the one exercised will largely depend on the type of regime instituted in
the new state.
In order clarify the process in which to answer the aforementioned question,
several supporting questions provide direction. The first is to ask among other Middle
Eastern/North African states where a women's movement emerged during or promptly
following regime liberalization, does a general pattern exist against which to compare the
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Palestinian case? A follow-on question more specifically addresses the impact of the
institutionalized political system, the organizational strength of women's socio-political
groups, and degree of collective social awareness on the effectiveness of the movement in
each case study. By applying the comparative analysis approach, one can use the
"lessons learned" in previous cases to seek a better understanding of the Palestinian
movement currently underway.
B. RELEVANCE
Beyond the argument that women comprise roughly half of the world's
population, there lies a need for comparative studies of women's movements as a viable
political force. The politicization of the gender issue in many developing countries is a
great cause for concern, especially to the particular regime in question. The ability of
women as a social group to generate grassroots support across gender lines and
potentially impact the political infrastructure has gained attention as a vehicle to induce
regime and cultural change.
The bulk of research that exists on women's movements in the Middle East
focuses on specific country studies, treating each as autonomous occurrences. In limiting
the scope to a case-by-case basis, one neglects to identify parallels that may be drawn by
cross-national comparison. This thesis attempts to take the current research on individual
countries and synthesize the variables in an effort to present a coherent understanding of
the impact of regime liberalization on women's movements in Middle East/North Africa
(MENA) countries.
C. METHODOLOGY
This study is based upon social movement theory and employs a method of
comparative analysis to examine similarities that transcend national borders. Using
historical examples of women's movements that developed in four MENA countries
during periods of regime liberalization, I identify specific variables such as the type of
regime in power, the strength and scope of women's groups, and the extent of mass
support for the groups' objectives in each case. More specifically, I look at how the
institutions of education, labor, and social codes impact the roles of women in their
respective states. These variables comprise the foundation for a matrix that I use to
develop an accurate forecast for the Palestinian women's movement in the event the
Occupied Territories become independent.
I consulted a variety of sources for the production of this work. The primary
influence is scholarly analysis found in academic publications such as books, journals,
and newspapers. A second source of information includes public opinion polls conducted
by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies and the Jerusalem Media and
Communications Center. The studies conducted by the Fafo Institute for Applied Social
Science also provided valuable statistics. Information from the latter three sources
mainly concern the Palestinian case alone.
D. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides a brief synopsis of women's movements in four MENA
countries. The examples of Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan form the core upon
which the rest of the thesis is founded. The selection of a particular case for use in this
study depended upon the availability of information on the topic as well as its encounter
with a distinct instance of regime liberalization.
In Chapter III, the parameters against which to compare and contrast the
Palestinian case are set and defined. This framework takes the specific examples of the
cases in Chapter II and turns them into a working model of general themes in order to
analyze where the women's movement in the Occupied Territories is headed after the
establishment of a Palestinian state.
An in-depth discussion on the formation of the Palestinian women's movement is
presented in Chapter IV. The bulk of this chapter focuses on the impact of education and
labor opportunities preceding the Intifada that allowed women to generate public support
and attention during the national struggle. Moving to the post-Oslo period, I also look at
how the movement has shifted from pursuing the nationalist agenda to securing a
platform devoted primarily to the promotion ofwomen's rights.
Chapter V, based on a synthesis of the previous two chapters, seeks to provide an
answer to the primary question of this thesis. A presentation of two likely regime
compositions and their implications on the women's movement in a future Palestine are
the focus for this section. The conclusion of this chapter revisits the major points of this
research. It offers a concise summation of the argument, suggestions for future studies to
further understand women's movements in the region, and closing remarks.
E. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Before presenting the case studies, I would will visit the principal tenets of social
movement theory and provide a working definition of collective action for this project.
Social movement theory offers a general analysis of the dynamic between the political
process and political opportunity structures and clarifies the concept of collective action
necessary to conduct my thesis.
Sociologists John McAdarn, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald begin their
collective work entitled Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements with what they
feel are key characteristics to identifying the extent to which a social movement will be
successful. The qualities are categorized as political opportunities, mobilizing structures,
and framing processes. Scholars tend to focus their research on one area; before
expanding each concept, however, it is important to note that these variables are
interactive rather than independent and may serve to enhance one another. Furthermore,
social movements may largely emerge as a result of the political and social environment,
but "their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions" (McAdarn, 1996, p. 15).
The first aspect is that of political opportunities. They are understood in terms of
the institutionalized political system, the stability of elite alignments and the state's
capacity for repression (McAdarn, 1996, p. 10). It asks the question, "How much power
does the current regime possess?" and measures the extent to which there may be an
opening for a movement to survive. Most research in this area has sought to show how
changes in some aspect of a political system created new prospects for collective action,
focusing on expanding political opportunities in facilitating the emergence of a single
movement (McAdarn, 1996, p. 17). In several of my case studies, an emerging national
movement was the vehicle to explore an expansion of women's rights and responsibilities
in society. Unfortunately, as evidenced in Algeria, once the national movement
successfully gained independence from the colonizing power of France, it largely ignored
the women's issues it had promised to protect.
Although paying close attention to opportunities, this variable is just as much
affected by political constraints. The ability to deny a movement room to mobilize
becomes a critical weapon for the regime in power in that it may successfully restrict the
opposition's strength. In the case of Tunisia, the Bourguiba regime incorporated
women's issues into the character of the government. Instituting dramatic reforms such
as the prohibition of polygamy (the only MENA country to have such a policy),
Bourguiba was able to take charge of a feminist movement, leaving Tunisian women with
little choice but to let him lead their "movement."
Mobilizing structures form the second category of their discussion. According to
the authors, mobilizing structures are those collective vehicles through which people
mobilize and engage in collective action (McAdam, 1996, p. 4). They are not solely
formal, but may also be informal organizations. For example, the development of
women's charitable associations Egypt and Jordan served as informal venues for women
to interact with one another. In the formative stages, the primary concern is whether
mobilizing structures exist with enough strength to begin a sustained movement against
the regime (McAdam, 1996, p. 13). The women's committees in the Occupied
Territories during the Intifada were able to introduce a nationalist ideology to middle-
and lower-class Palestinians through social work programs in labor, health and education.
Once it starts to gain momentum, leaders must shift their focus from amassing general
support to effectively representing the voices of all sections of society participating in
their movement. Whether it began as an established institution or in an informal setting,
the change in approach is a necessary part of maintaining the energy of collective action
(McAdam, 1996, p. 13). Continuing to influence a large portion of society under the
framework of social committees, the Palestinian women's organizations successfully
amassed broad-based support for the national struggle.
"Mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are shared meanings
and definitions that people bring to their situation" (McAdam, 1996, p. 5). This is the
final characteristic of their synthesis, known as framing processes. Framing processes
allow people with similar objections to identify with one another and express their
independent grievances collectively (McAdam, 1996, p. 5). They need to feel that in
acting together, they can redress a common problem. Specifically applied to this thesis,
women in MENA countries function under a patriarchal social system. Through the
framing process of education, they are exposed to ideas that cause them to question their
status in the existing framework. A particular movement seeks to strategically frame its
efforts by focusing on the similarities of the aggrieved and the differences they have from
the "oppressor." The cultural impact of this tactic is that it allows a movement to
reshape the terms of public discourse (McAdam, 1996, p. 19). This aspect of theory is
easily fulfilled for women's movements since their identified "oppressor" is the
patriarchal social system.
Further clarifying the aforementioned work is another prominent scholar on social
movement theory. Sidney Tarrow's work, Power in Movement, emphasizes the rise and
fall of social movements as part of a political struggle as well as the outcome of changes
in political opportunity structure, state strategy, and transnational diffusion. He clearly
distinguishes between the concepts of contentious politics and social movements. The
difference lies in the strength and longevity of collective action. In Tarrow's words,
Contentious politics occurs when ordinary people, often in league with
more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites,
authorities, and opponents. But mounting, coordinating, and sustaining
them against powerful opponents are the unique contribution of a social
movement—an invention of the modern age and an accompaniment to the
rise of the modern state (Tarrow, 1998, p. 2).
An example of contentious politics for this study is found in the case of Algeria, where
women attached feminist aims to the broader social movement of the nationalists led by
men. After achieving independence and gaining freedom from the French, women's
issues were then largely ignored. Without a consolidated platform to voice their
frustrations and concerns, women lacked the strength to contend with the new regime.
The women's movement in Algeria reflected contentious politics, whereas the nationalist
struggle was a true social movement.
Social movements do not depend solely on framing. As previously noted in
McAdam's discussion of mobilizing structures, Tarrow also points out that a movement
must bring people together, shape coalitions, confront opponents, and "assure their own
future after the exhilaration of the peak of mobilization has passed" (Tarrow, 1998, p.
123). He does not dismiss the importance of framing processes, however. A movement
can be organized around strong ties of collective identity, whether real or constructed, but
it cannot do the work of mobilization. This aspect depends on framing those identities
so that they will lead to action, alliances, and interaction (Tarrow, 1998, p. 199).
In addressing the category of political opportunities, Tarrow believes that social
movements are not produced merely as a result of a political opening. The progression is
more complex. Instead, he suggests using political opportunities as evidence for when
contentious politics will emerge, setting in motion "a chain of causation that may
ultimately lead to sustained interaction with authorities and thence to social movements"
(Tarrow, 1998, p. 20). Furthermore, a social movement will rise out of contentious
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politics only when it taps into social networks and connective structures, producing
collective action frames and identities able to sustain their struggle with powerful
opponents (Tarrow, 1998, p. 23). This is evidenced by the upperclass charitable
organizations that exist only to accommodate a philanthropic need, unlike a true feminist
movement which seeks to mobilize middle- and lower-class women to the common cause
ofwomen's rights.
With this background, it is fitting to provide a working definition of collective
action for the study. Collective action is a coordinated effort to maintain contention
against an instituted regime for a common purpose. Based on political opportunity,
mobilizing processes and framing structures, collective action gives a movement strength
and momentum. In short, Tarrow finds:
Regarding the outcomes of social movements, the important point is that,
although movements usually conceive of themselves as outside of and
opposed to institutions, acting collectively inserts them into complex
policy networks, and thus within the reach of the state (Tarrow, 1998, p.
5).
Thus, the ultimate objective for a movement is to be identified by the state as a potential
force for disruption, necessitating the regime to give attention to its demands. Whether
those demands are met or not is determined by the breadth and depth of collective action.
The examination of women's movements fits within the framework of social
movement theory. Mobilizing structures include socio-political organizations based on
advancing women's issues. Another example would be the expansion of educational
opportunities for women in a particular country. Framing processes emerge within the
natural dichotomy between men and women. When women are able to consolidate and
vent their frustration at their subjection to a patriarchal system, the foundation for a
women's social movement is built.
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Social movement theory is also expanding its discussion to examine the
aforementioned concepts as they apply transnationally. This strengthens my approach to
analyze and compare the women's movements in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan not
as autonomous entities, but possibly as part of a universal framework that can be applied
to other countries to accurately predict outcomes of women's collective action in the
Middle East.
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II. CASE STUDIES: EGYPT, ALGERIA, TUNISIA, AND JORDAN
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief description of the development of
women's movements in four MENA countries. By examining these cases, I will show
that the incorporation of women in the educational system, particularly at the university
level, generates the foundation of women to begin a bona fide movement with the cause
of raising feminist issues such as amendments to marriage and divorce laws. This
development alone, however, is not sufficient to bring about changes on behalf of
women. The other aspect necessary to facilitate the emergence of a women's movement
is the political and social environment. In several cases, women attached their cause to a
greater, nationalist cause only to find themselves marginalized from the political scene
once national independence was achieved. I argue that only when a consolidated
women's movement emerges under the leadership of a well-educated professional class
will it be able to possibly withstand co-optation by the regime and disassociate its agenda
from the nationalist cause.
I selected each case according to several criteria. The most evident was that it had
to be a country in the region. It was also necessary for the country to have a developing
women's movement of some form. Another stipulation for inclusion was the evidence of
regime liberalization. For the purposes of this paper, regime liberalization is understood
as a degree of change within the existing political structure. This could vary from one
extreme—revolution and decolonization in Algeria—to the other, namely the limited
opening under the Hussein regime in Jordan to allow parliamentary elections as well as
the formation of political parties. The variation of cases, particularly with respect to
regime liberalization, permitted me to observe a general pattern of development regarding
11
women's movements among the countries. I was able to identify slight variations in each
country that may allow a better understanding of how the movements form and generate
support in a broad context that overrides the intricacies of a specific country.
These case studies are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to provide a
baseline familiarity with the aims as well as obstacles facing the mobilization of women
in the region. Each country's section opens with a short historical background in order to
put the movement into context. The remaining work focuses on variables with social
movement theory in mind: the educational opportunities afforded women, the
development of women's socio-political organizations, and the application of social
legislation in each country.
An anticipated criticism of this study is the question of time, especially since the
case studies range from Egypt in early 1900s to Jordan in the late 1980s. One may argue
that the women's movement in Algeria during the 1950s would have little to offer in the
form of projecting a viable Palestinian scenario in the 21st century. How can these
compare when a generational difference is readily apparent, not to mention that the
effects of Western influence and technology have greater impact as time goes on?
Although a valid critique, I would respond that regime liberalization, while considerate of
time, does not necessarily factor it as a constraint. Moreover, after presenting my cases, a
clearer understanding of the dynamics that affect women's movements unfolds, and one
will see that it is the coming together of political opportunities and mobilizing structures
that affects this process irrespective of time. Time is one factor to keep in mind, but the
synthesis of other variables transcends temporal considerations.
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A. EGYPT
The beginnings of a women's movement in Egypt are usually traced to the early
1900s. Politically, Egypt was trying to wrest free from British intervention, during which
time an Egyptian nationalism began to emerge. In this context of associating nationalism
with social reform, men originated as the supporters of reforming Egyptian society,
thereby promoting an improved status for women. The link between the status ofwomen
and the political state of the country thus became a recurring theme in Egyptian history
(Smock, 1977, p. 42). Although one finds in this time frame well-known figures such as
Huda Sha'rawi, it was not until the rise of the Nasser regime that a broad-based women's
movement came onto the scene. As best put by Cynthia Nelson:
Women's active participation in the political life of Egypt has a long
history. Most contemporary scholars associate the beginnings of an
authentic Egyptian women's movement with the 1919 revolution... The
period 1945-59 [was when] the women's movement came of age in the
sense that it experienced a diversification in ideology, tactics, and goals;
and it began to transcend its elitist origins and membership. Moreover,
during this period, the women's movement consciously shifted away from
being a welfare-oriented, mostly philanthropic activity, to a more
politicized movement that linked the struggle for women's full
participation in the decision-making processes to such political and social
concerns as the nationalist movement and class struggle (Nelson, 1991, p.
314).
Nelson's observation of the emergence of an enlightened women's movement during the
1950s runs concurrent with regime liberalization in the form of the rise of the Free
Officers to political power, a critical development when later compared to the Palestinian
case.
1. Education
During the nineteenth century, Egypt began a broad modernization program under
Mohammed Ali, who had ended the French occupation and asserted de facto separation
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from the Ottoman Empire. Along with plans to raise a strong army, other aspects of
society experienced modern "improvements": the economy, health, and especially
important for women, education (Badran, 1995, p. 6). Previously, under colonization,
women were not provided access to higher education through the state. They could
pursue it only in private or foreign institutions, primarily in France or England (Smock,
1977, p. 42). One can infer from this fact that only middle- and upper-class families
could afford such a luxury.
The earliest state-sponsored schools that allowed women to attend date back to
1832. Mohammed Ali founded a vocational school for the training of female midwives,
but initially the school was only able to attract girls from orphanages and poor families
(Smock, 1977, p. 41). Egyptian families had resisted sending their daughters for several
reasons, but the prevailing sentiment was that the institution was not credible and would
reflect poorly on the family honor (Badran, 1995, p. 9). The school eventually earned
respect and enrollment increased. In 1889 the government took another step and created
the Saniyah School, which after the turn of the century instituted a teachers' training
program (Badran, 1995, p. 9). This facilitated the process of using female instructors to
educate women, further widening society's acceptability of schooling for its girls.
The formal recognition of the right of women to receive an education came in the
Constitution of 1923, which included Article 19, a provision that called for all Egyptian
children aged six to twelve to receive, at a minimum, elementary education (Smock,
1977, p. 41). Although this law was never enforced and female education remained a
very sporadic practice at this time, it did prompt the construction of additional primary
schools. Egypt's present system of education dates from the rise of the Free Officers in
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1952. From this point, education was made compulsory for all children regardless of
gender from six through twelve years of age (Smock, 1977, p. 51).
Following the provisions provided in the Constitution of 1923, opportunities for
advanced education were soon opened to women. The first females were admitted to
Cairo University beginning in 1929. These graduates left in 1933 with degrees in the
arts. Gradually, many other programs were cleared for women's participation, including
medicine, law, commerce, engineering, and agronomy (Smock, 1977, p. 42). By 1952,
on the eve of the Nasserite revolution, 4,033 Egyptian women had received university
degrees (Smock, 1977, p. 42). Middle-class women's lives were most changed by
expanding opportunities for formal education. No longer a luxury for the elite of society,
women of lower social status were able to attend college because it was both affordable
and closer to home.
A major breakthrough for all Egyptians was Article Eight of the 1964
Constitution that declared, "The State guarantees equality of opportunities to all
Egyptians" (Badran, 1991, p. 218). This was translated into free university education,
with a guaranteed job available for every graduate. Women's literacy soared and even
greater numbers of women graduated from university and entered the labor force
(Badran, 1991, p. 218). During the 1960s and 1970s the numbers of women university
graduates continued to increase with a concomitant rise in their entry into various sectors
of the labor force, especially in the technical sectors (Badran, 1991, p. 219). In like
fashion of opening Cairo University to women in 1929, the education and work
opportunities created after 1952 took large numbers of women from middle- and lower-
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class rural families and elevated them to an equal status with the upperclass educated and
employed.
An outgrowth of increased education for women was their gains in the sphere of
employment. Women found job opportunities mainly in those areas that corresponded
with the immediate priorities of the state, such as education and medicine. These were
fields in which women professionals typically served the needs of other women (Badran,
1991, p. 208). In this way, although the Egyptian educational system theoretically
provided equality of opportunity for Egyptian girls, it was not prepared to grant women
an all-encompassing role in society (Smock, 1977, p. 51).
2. Socio-Political Organizations
In response to the growing nationalistic sentiment, women began to support social
reform in the public arena. Their first active participation in public life came during the
1919 uprisings in Egypt that sought to expel the British. Women demonstrated in strikes
and, although unsuccessful in achieving the goal of dislodging the British, announced
their arrival as a legitimate social force (Smock, 1977, p. 42). They did not, however,
have structures in place to form an independent movement from the men, nor did they
find it necessary at the time. Unfortunately, women were dismissed by the very men who
had previously used nationalism to promote social reform and generate mass support for
their platform. They felt betrayed by men who were not prepared to implement their
promise to integrate women into public life after Egyptian political independence in 1922
(Badran, 1991, p. 207).
Active feminism in Egypt began in the same year, when Huda Sha'rawi founded
the Arab Feminist Union (AFU). Affiliated with the International Alliance for Women's
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Suffrage, the AFU sought to extend voting rights to Arab women (Smock, 1977, p. 42).
Within the scope of the AFU, Sha'rawi created an exclusive Egyptian branch in 1923, the
Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU). It was at this point that feminism focused a broad
agenda of claims for political, social, economic, and legal rights, with initial priority
given to women's education and the reform of personal status laws (Badran, 1991, p.
208). The EFU expanded the goals of its parent AFU to include a program aimed at
raising the intellectual and social standards of Egyptian women to ready them for full
participation in national life (Smock, 1977, p.43). They demanded free access to all
schools of higher education for women and reform of the marriage and divorce laws.
Recalling that the state did not implement free university education until 1964, these
women were laying the groundwork for future improvements. Many scholars, however,
are quick to point out that activity during this time should not be overestimated. Audrey
Smock notes:
The very women who could provide the leadership for a feminist
movement, those with education and high social standing, generally have
little inclination to do so because they suffer the fewest disabilities under
the present system. Elite women dominate women's voluntary
associations, most of which are exclusively social welfare in their '
orientation. Others, like the Cairo Women's Club, resemble the
sophisticated clubs of leisured society women found elsewhere in the
world (Smock, 1977, p. 72).
The EFU appealed to a small group of well-educated women who had been exposed to
Western culture, whereas the vast majority of Egyptian women were secluded from such
ideals. They remained outside EFU participation and were not even aware that the Union
existed for their "interests" (Smock, 1977, p. 43).
It did not take long for factionalization to threaten the solidarity of the emerging
women's movement. In 1935, Zainab Al Ghazali joined the EFU. Dissatisfied with the
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group, she formed the Muslim Women's Society (MWS), stating that "the Egyptian
Feminist Union wanted to establish the civilization of the Western women in Egypt and
the rest of the Arab and Islamic worlds" (Badran, 1991, p. 210). Herein lies the
beginning of a competing discourse between secular and religious feminists in Egypt that
continues today. As put by Margot Badran:
While the EFU women found their feminist ideology and program
compatible with Islam and sought its legitimizing force, their overall
ideological framework was secular rather than religious. For Al Ghazali
and the MWS on the other hand, since the Shari'a regulates all aspects of
life, a separate ideology of feminism was an undermining Western
ideology (Badran, 1991, p. 210).
Toward the end of the 1930s and 1940s, feminism in Egypt started to expand its
objectives to reach the lower classes, resulting in an abundance of new organizations
(Badran, 1991, p. 211). Using the EFU as a springboard, former members founded the
National Feminist Party (NFP) in 1944 and The Daughter of the Nile Union (DNU) in
1948. Both the NFP and the DNU mounted literacy and hygiene campaigns among the
poor. They also expressed concern with family law reform, education, and work rights
for women (Badran, 1991, p. 212). Although noteworthy in their own right, women's
organizations remained as charitable groups that assisted the lower class rather than
incorporating them as members.
The state, in conjunction with the official religious establishment, came down
firmly against the political rights of women during the 1950s and the rise of the Free
Officers under Nasser. Effecting a ban on feminist organizations, the regime dismantled
the EFU, allowing a small branch of it to continue with a purely social focus.
Conservative Islamist scholars and thinkers were tolerated, but radical Islam as well as
feminist discourse outside the scope of government regulation was suppressed.
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New laws forbade the formation of women's political organizations, and complete
suppression of the movement was achieved by 1959 (Badran, 1991, p. 217).
Nevertheless, feminist organizations continued their activism, even when forced
underground. Using voluntary associations of mixed gender as a vehicle, women were
able to sustain their contacts. According to a Ministry of Social Affairs Survey, in 1960
there were 3,195 voluntary associations with some 700,000 members, of whom eight
percent were women (Smock, 1977, p. 68).
3. Political Rights and Personal Status Laws
The EFU played a pivotal role in effecting change in the political arena. In 1924
it achieved a breakthrough by successfully petitioning the government to raise the
minimum marriage age to sixteen for girls and eighteen for boys (Badran, 1991, p. 208).
EFU efforts were simultaneously rewarded and suppressed in 1956. The state granted
women the right to vote, but at the same time the government imposed measures that
effectively dismantled the EFU and its politically challenging platform (Badran, 1991, p.
217).
The principle of equality between the sexes had been written into the 1923
Constitution and followed up in the National Charter, with implications for personal
status laws. As one might suspect, the government was reluctant to assume the
responsibilities of fulfilling these pledges because of their disruptive potential to the
existing social order (Smock, 1977, p. 69). Reform of the personal status law provisions
on divorce, marriage, and inheritance would promote women's rights, but was considered
by many Egyptians a direct assault on Islam (Smock, 1977, p. 69).
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To illustrate this point, in 1958 the Egyptian government appointed a committee
to review the standing personal status laws and forward suggestions for change. The
committee submitted proposals to make polygamy illegal, raise the marriage age, and
amend divorce laws. When a draft law was published in 1966, its components were
much weaker than the initial suggestions: polygamy was not eliminated. Divorce would
be settled in court, but the father would gain custody of the children even if the mother
was favored for the separation (Smock, 1977, p. 71). This instance reveals the
unwillingness of the government to challenge pressure from the conservative elements of
the population.
B. ALGERIA
When compared to Egypt and the other countries of this study, the Algerian case
differs significantly in that a women's movement failed to coalesce into a platform from
which to challenge the government for social equality. An explanation for this absence
can be found in the colonization practices employed by the French from 1830 until
Algeria won its independence in 1962. In contrast to their colonial policy in Morocco
after 1912 and Tunisia after 1882, the French made an attempt to completely restructure
Algerian society. It sought to dismantle Islam and its practices, reorganize the economic
infrastructure, and impose a cultural network of French lodges and schools (Moghadam,
1993, p. 62). In short, France wanted to annex Algeria as its "fifth province."
As a result of the occupation of their country, Algerians experienced a sense of
disorientation, disarray, and disorder (Lazreg, 1994, p. 51). The French had two options
in their approach to the settlement of Algeria. First, they could contain it by creating
special institutions to manage it, as was the custom in its colonization of Morocco or
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Tunisia. The second alternative was to neutralize it by introducing laws and practices
that destroyed its foundations. Colonial authorities in Algeria chose to do both (Lazreg,
1994, p. 38). Not surprisingly, many Algerians came to regard Islam and the Muslim
family law as sanctuaries from French cultural imperialism (Moghadam, 1993, p. 62).
The Algerian revolution and decolonization from the French lasted six years, from
1954 to 1962. During the war of independence, women became a valuable force
multiplier on the battlefield for the Algerians. Military exigencies forced the officers of
the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN) to allow women to participate as part of its
organization. Upwards of 10,000 women were recorded as having participated in the
Algerian Revolution, with thousands more not offically accounted for. (Moghadam,
1993, p. 62). The overwhelming majority of those who served in the war performed
traditional functions such as nurses, cooks, and laundresses. But many women played an
essential role as couriers, and because the French rarely searched them, women were
often used to transport bombs. A select few women were even combatants. On all social
levels, women proved themselves to be an indispensable asset to the overall strength of
the nationalist movement.
Many women assumed that in the process of contributing significantly to the
success of the revolution, their efforts would be appropriately recognized in shaping the
agenda of the new state, particularly with respect to women's issues. Unfortunately, the
country's independence did not signify the emancipation ofwomen (Moghadam, 1993, p.
65). After gaining control of the state in 1962, the nationalist movement neglected to
grant women a place in domestic politics. The use of women as ideological subjects
during the revolution did not allow for "the creation of a social space that could have
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enabled them to enter debates over their status in their society as well as the impact of
colonial rule on their lives" (Lazreg, 1994, p. 87).
1. Education
Under French rule, educational institutions and opportunities were uneven and
varied from one Algerian district to the next. However, the most challenging aspect of
the education system with respect to women was neither a lack of space nor funding; it
was French ideology. From the colonizer's perspective, the education of native girls
seemed unnecessary and therefore not placed as a high priority on the French agenda
(Lazreg, 1994, p. 66).
To put the sentiment in empirical terms, between 1840 and 1949 the French had
opened 138 grade schools for boys. During the same time period, merely eleven girls'
schools were established (Lazreg, 1994, p. 88). Enrollment at this time is unsurprisingly
low. By 1951 there were only 6,696 girls in grade school, making women's participation
more symbolic than real. Furthermore, the number ofwomen who were eligible to attend
high school and college decreased dramatically. In the same year, 1,014 girls went to
high school and only 5 1 women studied at the university level. Without strong numbers
of women afforded the opportunity of advanced education, little could be done to foster a
collective sentiment of feminist issues on the national level, thereby forcing women to
remained silent on the eve of the revolution. Marnia Lazreg explains this silence as a
reflection of women's structural marginalization by the colonizer's society. The French
had successfully paralyzed the development of any strain of a women's movement simply
by restricting their access to education (Lazreg, 1994, p. 96).
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Those girls who were exposed to French schooling received a limited curriculum
when compared to that of the boys. Although boys were taught to be "docile, submissive,
and good subjects," these qualities were to be achieved through mastery of the French
language, arithmetic, geography, history, and religion (Lazreg, 1994, p. 75). Girls were
exposed to French grammar, arithmetic, and geography, but did not receive any courses
in history (Lazreg, 1994, p. 69). The education of Algerian women focused on sewing
and needlework as hobbies to help them avoid boredom and occupy their minds (Lazreg,
1994, p. 75). As a result, the average Algerian girl could not hope for a transformation
of her life through higher learning, and education was not presented in a way to even
cultivate such a thought (Lazreg, 1994, p. 78).
2. Socio-Political Organizations
There is little to be said on development of women's organizations during or
immediately following the Algerian revolution for the basic reason that women had not
foreseen this window of opportunity. Lacking a class of university-educated,
professional women to advance a feminist agenda as well as associating their
emancipation with freedom from French occupation, Algerian women entrusted men of
the nationalist movement to forge gains on their behalf. Lazreg affirms this position by
pointing to structurally-induced measures during colonization that marginalized women
from the domestic political scene. The fact that no women voiced opinions about
Algerian culture and institutions leads one to question what caused this silence. It is a
logical conclusion that their reticence was probably not self-imposed for a strategic
purpose, but rather as a result of an absence of a platform upon which women could
express their concerns (Lazreg, 1994, p. 78).
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An illustration of their marginality is found in the failure of women to stimulate
Algerian public discussion of feminist issues. Specific examples include the expansion
of women's roles in society and the promotion of women's rights on par with men within
the tenets of Islam (Lazreg, 1994, p. 86). The nationalist goal to instill Algerians with a
sense of pride in their identity did not extend as far as to include women as full-fledged
members of their society. Instead, the nationalists preserved Algeria's patriarchal
structure in order to discourage any potential threats to their power base vis-a-vis an
independent women's movement.
3. Political Rights and Personal Status Laws
In the waning years of the revolution, the French began to manipulate gender
issues in an effort to preserve itself as the legitimate power in Algeria. Colonial
authorities sought to implement personal status laws as a means to gain the favor and
support of Algerian women for a continued occupation, but their efforts were seen as too
little, too late (Lazreg, 1994, p. 90). Nevertheless, the French promulgated laws
pertaining to marriage in a February 1959 ordinance as well as a September 1959 public
decree. Provisions of these documents prohibited marriage at an early age and made
consent of spouses the sole requirement of marriages. A woman no longer needed a
guardian's permission to marry, a significant change in social policy and seen as a direct
blow to the religious establishment (Lazreg, 1994, p. 90). The timing of the law most
likely prevented it from having a positive and lasting impression on Algerian society.
The country had been entrenched in seven years of war and was merely three years away
from independence. Had it appeared at the turn of the century, Lazreg feels that the law
would have made a greater impact on women's lives (Lazreg, 1994, p. 91).
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Although a women's movement did not take shape during the revolution, feminist
issues were not completely ignored. After independence, for example, the September
1962 constitution guaranteed equality between the sexes and granted women the right to
vote. Ten women were even elected deputies of the new National Assembly after
independence (Moghadam, 1993, p. 65).
The French provisions on marriage remained part of Algerian law until the 1980s,
although widespread awareness did not permeate throughout society. Islamist efforts to
reverse these statutes were finally rewarded in the passage of the 1984 Family Code.
Instead of progressing or broadening women's liberation, the Code did away with many
of the reforms of 1959. The Islamists celebrated this victory, which provided them an
institutionalized justification to promote inequality between women and men in family
matters (Lazreg, 1994, p. 91).
C. TUNISIA
After gaining its independence from France in 1956, Tunisia entered a period of
modernization under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba. Prior to entering office,
Bourguiba was backed by the Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD), which in turn became
the official state party. The 1959 national constitution officially established Tunisia as a
republic and delineated the responsibilities of the president in the areas of legislative as
well as executive matters (Micaud, 1964, p. 94). During his first year as president,
however, Bourguiba launched significant societal reforms on his own initiative and
without consultation of the Constituent Assembly (Micaud, 1964, p. 94). This set the
stage for the authoritarian nature of Tunisian politics over the next thirty years, until
Bourguiba retired from office.
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Tunisian socialists had strongly advocated female emancipation prior to Tunisian
independence, recognizing it as a necessary step toward modernization. The nationalists,
on the other hand, hedged on this issue and were satisfied to give women cursory
consideration in the form of increased female education. (Micaud, 1964, p. 50) In this
respect, women were fortunate to have inherited the socialist nature of the Bourguiba
regime. Nonetheless, it did not foster an independent women's movement; instead,
women's issues were identified and commanded by the government. Bourguiba's intent
was to bring under state control all forms of civil society organization, including the
feminist movement, which he accomplished quite successfully (Brand, 1998, p. 179).
As the "Liberator of Tunisian Women," Bourguiba prided himself as having
spared Tunisian women from struggling with feminist issues on their own. But although
he emancipated them through social legislation, he simultaneously established his control
over the future ability for women to organize. Bourguiba not only championed the
women's movement, he politicized issues of gender and challenged the authority of the
religious establishment in matters of social regulation. Brand comments that:
issues related to women became the lightening rod in attacks against and
defenses of laicism in general. This made women the first natural line of
defense as well as the first likely victims in any challenge to the state by
the Islamists (Brand, 1998, p. 181).
True to this statement, at the height of Islamist strength in the form of a consolidated
movement during the 1980s, the social reforms promulgated by Bourguiba in the early
years of his tenure were the first to undergo criticisms from the conservative elements
contending for power. Nevertheless, the laws still stand today.
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1. Education
Bourguiba viewed education as the cornerstone of his modernization program.
The extra attention given to provide widespread schooling in Tunisia resulted in
tremendous benefits for women. In general, school enrollment doubled every five years
in the first two decades since independence. A ten-year education program launched in
1958 aimed to achieve universal primary education by 1969. Not excluded from the
program, the enrollment of girls increases rapidly and exponentially: in 1940, there were
6,000 girls attending school; 70,000 were recorded at the time of independence in 1956;
and by 1961, the number neared 200,000 (Micaud, 1964, p. 149).
Furthermore, the government expected the number of students in secondary
schools and universities to quadruple from 1959 to 1969 (Micaud, 1964, p. 158). The
Bourguiba administration foresaw the expansion of a secondary education an investment
toward large-scale returns on the economic future of Tunisia and therefore a necessary
sector to develop. In addition to the state's increased focus on advanced schooling, the
popular response among Tunisians was also positive. Micaud notes that parents were
eager to send their children to school and wanted them to pass the exams necessary to
enable them study on the secondary level (Micaud, 1964, p. 157).
The University of Tunis was founded in 1960 as a replacement for the French-
inspired Institut des Hautes Etudes, in Tunis since 1945 (Micaud, 1964, p. 155). Women
were accepted as students from its inception. Of the 40,000 students enrolled in the
University of Tunis in 1984, women comprised about forty percent of the student
population (Nelson, 1986, p. 248).
27
It is important not to overestimate the impact of Bourguiba's reforms on women.
Education was seen as central to modernization, but was not to interfere with a woman's
primary role in the home (Brand, 1998, p. 205). Moreover, the conservative concern with
the expanding rights and responsibilities of women in the academic realm began to creep
back into public discussion from a cabinet-level representatives. During the discussion of
the 1990 budget, for example, deputies of the Ministry of Higher Education argued that
the increasing feminization of the educational structure was significantly hurting
standards (Brand, 1998, p. 195).
2. Socio-Political Organizations*
The Union Musulmane des Femmes de Tunisie (UMFT) is recognized as the first formal
women's organization in Tunisia. It was established in 1936 and focused its attention on
expanding educational opportunities to women. Shortly thereafter, the members of the
Tunisian Communist Party founded the Union des Femmes de Tunisie (UFT).
Its agenda centered on social issues and labor organizing. The UFT also voiced its
support for the anti-colonial struggle. Despite its activities, the UFT remained a marginal
organization for two reasons: its founders were primarily European, and its members
espoused communism. The national movement itself devoted little attention to women's
issues, with the prevailing sentiment that pursuance of their rights would be more
appropriate after liberation.
Immediately upon taking office, Bourguiba put in place a sweeping, centralized
state apparatus in the form of a large bureaucracy. The PSD was the only political party
* The majority of the material presented in this section is drawn from Laurie Brand's work, Women, the
State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences, 1998. Unless
otherwise indicated, the information taken from her argument is found on pages 177-222.
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authorized to exist, and subordinate organizations were required to report to it. Women's
associations were no exception. Nearly all of the organizations depended on state for
funding, drew their leadership from the ranks of the PSD, and were subject to strict
government review and intervention.
Bourguiba's efforts to channel popular political participation through a vast state-
controlled network extended to the women's movement. The 1956 establishment of the
Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie (UNFT) was created in this spirit. It aimed to
provide instruction to women in a variety of areas, including literacy, family planning,
and sewing (Nelson, 1986, p. 249). Following the formation of the UNFT, the UFT was
given the option to integrate with it. No longer authorized by the government to exist
independently, many UFT members chose to join the UNFT. Those who resisted were
driven underground, and the UFT was completely dissolved by 1 963
.
While the UNFT regularly forwarded reports on women's issues to the regime, it
rarely initiated proposals for substantive changes. The UNFT was controlled by a core of
women who were staunch PSD members and kept in close contact with Bourguiba.
These women ensured that the UNFT implemented policy passed down by the state and
did little to stir the existing order.
One of the negative consequences of the closely-tied UNFT affiliation to the state
was that the leadership became a puppet in the hands of the regime. One promising
exception came with the UNFT presidency of 1973 with Fathia Mzali, a PSD party
activist and wife of then-Minister of Education Mohammed Mzali. Although she met the
criteria to lead the UNFT, Mzali initiated a discourse on the function of the group, stating
in 1978 that "we still don't know if the UNFT is supposed to be primarily involved in
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politics or economics, if it is supposed to defend the rights of women or if it should
devote itself solely to social work" (As cited in Brand, 1998, p. 220). Using this as an
opportunity to expand its work, the UNFT wanted to dedicated one segment of its
energies solely to women's interests. However, when Mzali was also appointed the first
minister of a new cabinet branch named "Family and Promotion of Women," the UNFT
initiatives stagnated. She continued on as president of the UNFT, and the separation
between the state and the organization became even more blurred, creating a conflict of
interests for the women's group.
At around the same time of Mzali accepted the ministerial position, an
autonomous women's movement began to form. Comprised of educators and
intellectuals, the Club d'Etudes de la Condition des Femmes (CECF) was an organization
started in 1978 independently of the regime. The CECF challenged the UNFT, and in
turn, the state. A prime example of the CECF's agenda occurred when its members
organized a meeting outside of Tunis to provide an open forum on women's issues. They
sought to facilitate a discussion of women's issues despite the recognition of formal
social rights and without intimidation from the Bourguiba regime. Shortly after its
formation, the CECF split over the issue of whether or not to present draft changes of
Code de Statut Personnel, a decision that was never resolved and caused internal
breakdown of the group.
3. Political Rights and Personal Status Laws
Legislation was the primary instrument for the president to effect change. While
centralizing women's activity under one organization, Bourguiba presented a series of
laws aimed at upgrading women's status on the social scene. Brand stresses that his
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policies on women were only one part of a broader strategy by which he sought to set
Tunisia on the road to modernization (Brand, 1998, p. 204). The earliest and most
dramatic change in family law occurred in Tunisia in 1957, when Bourguiba introduced
the Code du Statut Personnel (CSP). With the CSP, Bourguiba took a bold step,
promoting significant change while continuing to maintain authority and control of the
state.
The CSP regulated four central women's issues, effectively ending religious
jurisdiction. First, women were granted the right to consent to marriage. No longer
forced against her will, this provision transformed marriage from an agreement between
two families to a contract based on the mutual consent of two individuals (Micaud, 1 964,
p. 147). Next, it set the minimum marriage age to twenty for men and seventeen for
women. Couples who wanted to marry at an earlier age were required to obtain special
civil court authorization. Third, polygamy was outlawed, and considered a crime
punishable by a fine and imprisonment. Tunisia remains the only Arab state with this law
officially on record. Finally, divorce would be administered by the civil courts. The CSP
identified separate types of divorce: mutually consented or initiated by one spouse. In
either case, it required an attempt at reconciliation, and divorce was final only through a
judicial decision delivered by the courts (Brand, 1998, p. 208).
The personal status code replaced Quranic law with a unified legal system for all
Tunisians. Bourguiba carefully framed these changes within a "modernist" presentation
of religion, but the Islamists were marginalized as a result (Brand, 1998, p. 178). From
their viewpoint, shifts in social regulation weakened control of women through the
family, the central unit in the construction of Islamist society. Furthermore, the code was
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seen as an assault on the only area of law in which Islamic precepts had previously
prevailed (Brand, 1998, p. 180).
D. JORDAN
For nearly fifty years, King Hussein reigned as Jordan's leader. From 1953 until
his death in 1999, Hussein effectively was the state. His tenure, however, was not
without its difficulties. One important instance in terms of the Jordanian women's
movement was the political liberalization policies that were instituted in the late 1980s to
quell an explosive discontent with austere economic measures. The parliamentary
elections of 1989 would serve as a vehicle for women to enter the political arena, but
intervention of royalty has ultimately stagnated the women's movement in Jordan.
1. Education
Education in Jordan became compulsory with the promulgation of the amended
1952 constitution, which called for nine years of schooling for its youth. In practice,
however, there is no strict enforcement of attendance; the decision about a child's
education is left to the family, usually the patriarch. He may or may not see the
advantage of educating a daughter, particularly not if she contributes an economic
purpose in the home. The proximity of institutions is another consideration. Since many
villages do not maintain school facilities, families are unwilling or unable to afford
sending their daughters away for education (Brand, 1998, p. 130).
In 1921, when the Emirate of Jordan was established, educational facilities
consisted of twenty-five religious schools that provided a rather limited curriculum.
After the creation of Jordan as an independent state, emphasis on education intensified.
Every year since the late 1950s, increasing numbers of Jordan's youth have received
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formal training in the country's rapidly expanding education system. By the late 1980s,
nearly all children aged six to twelve years were attending free and compulsory primary
schools. In 1987, for example, there were 3,366 schools with more than 919,645
students (Metz, 1991, p. 114). Almost eighty percent of children aged thirteen to fifteen
were reported to be attending three-year preparatory schools (Metz, 1991, p. 66).
Jordan's school system is divided into four levels. Primary schools run from
grades one through six, while preparatory schools follow on with grades seven through
nine. If a student passes the entrance exams, he is admitted to a secondary school for
grades ten through twelve. Post-secondary institutions account for all higher education.
In 1987, around 69,000 students were enrolled in higher education, and women
accounted for half of those spots (Metz, 1991, p. 116). Of Jordan's four universities—the
University of Jordan in Amman, Yarmuk Univeristy, Jordan University of Science and
Technology, and Mutah University—over half of the students in 1985 were women
(Metz, 1991, p. 116). Making post-secondary education more widely available, a
community college network was started in the late 1980s with 53 schools under its
domain.
2. Socio-Political Organizations
The first women's associations in Jordan emerged during the 1940s in the same
fashion as those in Egypt during the 1920s. Generally speaking, women's initiatives
during this period consisted of holding meetings to address women's issues on health and
welfare as well as to provide Jordanian mothers with more modern techniques to care for
their children's needs (Brand, 1998, p. 121). In 1944, the Women's Social Solidarity
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Society was formed and placed under the leadership of Princess Misbah (Gallagher,
1995, p. 211). Its goals were mostly charitable: to care for children and provide
assistance to the poor and needy. A year later, another group entered the scene. The
Society of the Jordanian Women's Federation, headed by Princess Zayn, set out to raise
social status of women (Brand, 1998, p. 121). The two societies were then merged into
the government-sponsored Jordanian Women's Hashemite Union, but it dissolved within
a year (Gallagher, 1995, p. 21 1).
Although ceasing to exist, the Jordanian Women's Hashemite Union set the
example for future women's associations in Jordan. Between 1951 and 1979, more than
340 charitable societies were established throughout the kingdom. Unfortunately, their
work would not progress beyond that of a social group. According to Brand,
These groups generally comprised wealthy women who, as a way of
filling free time, provided assistance to alleviate poverty or to support
orphanages and similar institutions. Most of their time was devoted to
parties and elaborate meetings, with little energy spent on serious work
(Brand, 1998, p. 121).
Emerging in the midst of the purely social nature of the aforementioned groups
was a women's movement that began to formulate and pursue a political agenda in the
1950s. These organizations differed from their predecessors in that they were concerned
with improving social conditions and raising the educational level of Jordanian women,
as well as promoting better child health care (Brand, 1998, p. 121). The first such group
was the Arab Women's Federation (AWF), established in 1954. Its aims were to fight
illiteracy, raise women's socioeconomic levels, prepare women to exercise rights as full
" The early participation of royalty in the women's movement is significant in that it sets a precedent for
future efforts. As later discussed, the current Jordanian women's front has been assumed by Princess
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citizens, and develop bonds with other Arab women as well as with women around the
world (Brand, 1998, p. 121).
The 1970s saw a continuation and expansion women's groups on the political
front. During the era of martial law that followed the 1967 defeat in the Arab-Israeli
War, educated and professional women began to distinguish their interests from national
struggles and to organize around issues such as the right to equal employment (Gallagher,
1995, p. 211).
Licensed by the Ministry of the Interior in 1974, the Society of the Women's
Federation in Jordan (WFJ) espoused goals toward raising women's educational and
socioeconomic levels, and was similar to the AWF with a Jordanian focus. The WJP also
published studies on women and their rights, a bold step not taken to this point (Brand,
1998, p. 121). On the other hand, the Business and Professional Women's Club (BPWC)
established in 1976 professed to be another professional association. Its officers were
well-connected women, yet they held with little business experience aside from being the
wives of prominent businessmen (Brand, 1998, p. 28).
Women's organizations existed in great numbers in Jordan, but the problem was
that they were not unified in their efforts or approaches to initiate change. Perceived as
antagonistic to the government, the WFJ was shut down by the same ministry that
instituted it (Brand, 1998, p. 126). It is more likely that the organization was closed
because the regime had lost control over it. The closure of the WFJ left Jordanian
women without an independent institutional framework to pursue or discuss central
feminist issues. Emerging from this vacuum was the General Federation of Jordanian
Basma.
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Women (GFJW), which unsuccessfully tried to join together the existing women's social
societies with leading women activists in the form a new union (Brand, 1998, p. 126).
The GFJW met several roadblocks. Unlike the WFJ, the GFJW was recognized by only
one wing of the General Federation of Arab Women. Furthermore, it remained isolated
from the majority of Jordanian women and lacked a progressive agenda. The final blow
to the GFJW was that of membership. It depended upon societies and clubs to provide
members who would be subjected to the oversight of the Ministry of Social Development
(Brand, 1998, p. 127).
As a result of a lacking solidarity among independent women's groups, there has
been a clear reassertion of state involvement that further discourages activity outside of
the official framework (Brand, 1998, p. 171). Representing royal intervention to dictate
movement is Princess Basma. Brand says that "the argument is that Princess Basma has
been given the 'women's movement' portfolio. In this role she must strike a balance
between modernization and tradition acceptable to the broader regime and societal
concerns" (Brand, 1998, p. 170). Accordingly, the Princess established the Jordanian
National Committee for Women (JNCW) in 1992. This group's functions consisted of
working to improve women's social status and increase their involvement in
development, upgrading their legal status, and improving their political participation
(Brand, 1998, p. 173).
In 1993, Jordan had a few hundred women's associations, five women's
organizations and two women's unions. They see each other as rivals for members and
compete for resources, and thus have not successfully consolidated their efforts to
advance women's issues (Brand, 1998, p. 168). While Jordan has a long history of
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women's socio-political organizations, little gains have presented themselves as a result.
The fragmented nature of the women's movement provided an opening for the regime to
intervene, upon which it promptly capitalized in the form of Princess Basma.
3. Political Rights and Personal Status Laws
At the highest level of Jordanian legislation, the constitution states that all citizens
are equal under the law in terms of rights and obligations. However, there is no explicit
ban of discrimination on the basis of gender, even though specific protections against
prejudices of race, language, and religion were included (Brand, 1998, p. 130). Only in
National Charter of 1991 did a specific clause appear addressing the issue, stating that
"Jordanians, men and women, are equal before the law, with no discrimination between
them in rights and responsibilities, regardless of race, language, or religion" (As cited in
Brand, 1998, p. 135). The stronger language of the charter leaves no question that
women are considered equivalent to men, as was the case in the constitutional clause.
Outside of official domestic documents, Jordan has been the signatory of several
international conventions. It ratified a UN convention against all forms of discrimination
against women, as well as other international conventions specifically addressing ,the
issues of marriage age and marriage contracts. Jordan's acceptance of these conventions
is not widely known, especially among its constituents (Brand, 1998, p. 135). Therefore
it is difficult to assess advantages the acceptance of such documents means for Jordanian
women.
Citizenship is a sensitive issue in Jordanian politics. All Jordanian men and
women are entitled to citizenship, although only a man can pass his citizenship onto his
children (Brand, 1998, p. 130). A draft law was submitted to the regime that calls for the
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ability of Jordanian women to pass their nationality onto their children and foreign
husbands, but no ruling has yet been made. (Brand, 1998, p. 137)
On the major personal status laws of marriage and divorce, Jordan continues to
allow polygamy and arbitrary divorce on the part of the husband. Jordan also maintains a
younger legal marriage age than the other countries of this study at fifteen (Gallagher,
1995, p. 209). More alarming is the legislation regarding honor killings. According to a
section of the 1 960 penal code, "he who discovers his wife or one of his female relatives
committing adultery and kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them is exempted from
any penalty" (As cited in Brand, 1998, p. 133). Taken together, these laws convey to a
Jordanian woman that overall control rests with her male family members (Brand, 1998,
p. 139).
Women's organizations seek to change some of the aforementioned provisions
through draft laws. For example, one draft law amends passport legislation to allow
women the right to acquire passports without the approval of their husbands.
Unfortunately, these have not received much attention. Brand explains that:
successive prime ministers and governments, as well as the palace, may
have preferred to maintain the appearance of working on a new draft, thus
placating those who want change while never actually presenting one, thus
avoiding the outcry from both liberal and conservative circles that any
proposed changes would be likely to trigger (Brand, 1998, p. 150).
E. CONCLUSIONS
From the preceding country sketches, I observed that changes in a political regime
negatively affected the organizational strength of a feminist movement when it lacked the
development of a university-educated, professional women's class. If a women's
movement is able to promote an agenda that generates broad-based support and
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transcends class divisions, then it will more likely be prepared to challenge a regime
undergoing liberalization to institute social changes for its members. The intervening
variable that appears to influence the organizational strength of a women's movement in
light of regime liberalization is the degree to which women are integrated into the
educational system.
Although all three of the aforementioned criteria—education, political
environment, and organizational strength of women's groups—are necessary components
of a feminist movement in the MENA case studies, one stands alone as the foundation for
its development. The expansion of university education opportunities to middle- and
lower-class women creates favorable circumstances that a movement may unfold. In
Egypt, for instance, women were admitted to Cairo University in 1929, producing nearly
4,000 graduates alone upon the rise of the Free Officers to power. By the 1940s, the
National Feminist Party began to pursue political rights for women. On the contrary,
Algerian university students numbered only 51 in 1951. During the revolution from 1954
to 1962, activist women trusted that their social emancipation would accompany
Algeria's independence from France and there was no separate movement of which to
speak. These examples highlight the general observation that university education for
women is positively correlated with the emergence of a leadership to orchestrate a
relatively autonomous women's movement.
The next important variable is the political environment in which a women's
movement arises. The cases provided diverse examples of this aspect. In Tunisia, the
government was ready to implement social and cultural changes that benefited women,
such as the ban on polygamy. In the same stroke, however, the regime effectively
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constrained the development of an independent women's movement because Bourguiba
held the power to determine to what level Tunisian women would be able to mobilize for
feminist rights. The same holds true in the other cases. An interesting observation is that
when women are forced to append their issues to a ongoing national movement for
whatever reason, their cause is largely ignored once independence is gained.
Finally, the strength of women's socio-political organizations affects the degree to
which the group will be able to sustain an autonomous movement in pursuance of
women's rights. Recalling social movement theory, McAdam describes the necessity of
mobilizing structures to first build a sustained movement against the regime, and next
construct a platform upon which its supporters can voice their concerns. Without these
two steps, a social movement will not last very long. In the case of Jordan, upperclass
women were content to provide charity to the needy of society. Since their aim never
extended beyond a charitable mission, they were unable to amass general support for
their associations to bloom into active feminist forums.
Thus far, I have reiterated the importance of education, the political environment,
and organizational strength as major factors in determining the success or failure of a
cohesive women's movement to effect social and cultural changes. The next chapter
revisits these variables as well as other contributing factors in greater detail in order to
present a clear understanding of what to look for in evaluating the Palestinian case.
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III. THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK
Thus far, I have highlighted the development of women's movements in Egypt,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan according to three variables: education, socio-political
organizations, and personal status laws. This chapter will present common themes found
in the cases in order to expose a general dynamic that the movements share despite their
individual intricacies. The goal is to determine whether the framing processes
(education) and mobilizing structures (socio-political organizations) are advanced to the
point where a movement is ready to capitalize on an opportunity of regime liberalization
when it presents itself, thereby defining the emerging framework.
A. EDUCATION
Charles Micaud reveals an interesting fact regarding MENA women—in
traditional Muslim societies, they were uneducated and barred from any sort of social life
to the extent that linguists could isolate distinct female dialects in most Arab countries
(Micaud, 1964, p. 50). Under colonization, these societies were introduced to Western
political concept of nationhood and soon developed their own nationalist movements. An
important derivation from this shift in ideology was the concept of mass education to
enlighten and modernize the population.
Along these lines, I contend that as more women were afforded opportunities to
pursue higher education, a class of well-educated, professional females emerges. It is
from this group that a genuine women's movement develops, which pursues socio-
political issues rather than serving traditional, charitable functions. In order to
conceptualize and illustrate this argument, I compiled data furnished by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization into Figures 1 and 2. The
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information was drawn from annual issues of the United Nations Statistical Yearbook
from 1956 through 1970. For both figures, I looked at the enrollment data of female
students in pre-primary, primary, secondary, and higher education. I also noted the
population estimates provided for the same time period.
Before explaining the results, it is important to note the limitations of these
graphs. Many data sets did not contain complete information from year to year. Within a
specified year, the statistics were often provisional or estimated. Also, the time frame of
the information does not extend back beyond the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, lacking a
more reliable source, I was aware of these deficiencies in the analysis of this data.
1. Percentage ofWomen Enrolled in School
In order to use the data comparatively, I had to construct a scale that would
account for large population differences between the countries. For Figure 1, I first
added the number of female students enrolled in each level of a country's educational
system: pre-primary, primary, secondary, and tertiary/higher. Next, I entered the
statistics recorded for the country's female population. Finally, I expressed this data in
terms of a percent ratio, dividing the number of women educated by the female
population. Although a crude formulation, it served the purpose.
In three countries—Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan—the government has proclaimed
education to be free, compulsory, and universal in principle. Tunisia differs in that
education is free, but neither universal nor compulsory. Nevertheless, it is Algeria that















































Figure 1: # Women in University to Total Female Population.
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began to extend more academic opportunities to its girls. Tunisia and Egypt both display
steady increases when subjected to this calculation. As the graph shows, Jordan has the
most dramatic increase in female enrollment in a sharp, upward trend, especially since
1968. The fluctuation in the Jordanian plot is explained by the population statistics
provided. UNESCO explains that the results were based on a census of housing, which
included a count of persons by sex. No formal census of the population has ever been
taken in Jordan for the apparent reason that it is heavily comprised of Palestinians.
2. Percentage ofWomen Enrolled at the University Level
The more revealing graph (Figure 2) looks exclusively at the number of women
enrolled in a country's university program. The calculation for this graph followed the
same procedure as used in Figure 1, except in this case I focused on the data provided
only at the tertiary/higher level versus total female population.
This data reinforces my hypothesis that an authentic women's movement
emerges from a class of highly educated, professional women. Egypt proved to be the
best country among those studied for a woman to pursue a university-level academic
program. From start to finish, Egypt outperformed the other countries. Interestingly,
Egypt also held the most autonomous women's movement of the four cases. Jordan's
trend parallels that of Egypt, but to a lesser degree. I would also rank it second among
the MENA cases with respect to the independent nature of its women's movement.
Tunisia is the next plot in descending order on the graph. As indicated in the previous
chapter, Tunisian women benefited from extensive social reform put into effect by the
regime, but had little to no women's movement to speak of at that time. Further
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Figure 2: # Women Enrolled in School to Total Female Population.
45

professional class of women is the Algerian case. Its percentages remain on the low end,
with a slight upturn in the 1970s. Moreover, until 1970, there is no noticeable
appreciation of university female enrollment. I was unable to locate a specific reasoning
for the change after the 1970s, but only until very recently have Algerian women begun
to consolidate their efforts to combat the Islamist influence on personal status issues.
B. SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
As the education data shows, the effectiveness of women's organizations in the
MENA countries is derived from the university-educated women. These feminists have
the ability to mobilize lower- and middle-class women because they share similar social
backgrounds. Furthermore, they tend to define their goals in political vice charitable
terms. Elite women, on the other hand, are less likely to promote a feminist platform
because they are comfortable with the rights their social status affords them.
Consequently, women in the high social stratum interact with others of the same class
and pursue purely philanthropic missions.
Another consideration of women's mobilizing structures is the nature of the
leadership. Do individual women run the group or is it ultimately controlled by the
government? As we have seen in the case of Tunisia, the Bourguiba regime set the
organizational structure and agenda for the women. His assertion left Tunisian women
with little to do but follow his lead.
One factor in framing a women's movement is in the hands of the women
themselves. They face the decision of attaching the women's movement to a broader,
stronger nationalist movement or pursuing their emancipation independently of it.
Because of societal pressures, the choice is already made in most cases. It would be
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inappropriate for women to fight for a feminist cause outside of a nationalist movement if
they do not have strong organizations in place to amass support for their agenda. The
women then place their faith in the men to deliver egalitarian practices once national
independence is achieved. The downfall occurs more often than not when women's
issues are ignored following regime change. If they are able to consolidate their
grievances at this time, they may succeed in separating from and challenging the new
authority. Unfortunately, if the government takes over the women's movement before
organizations are in place to resist, the next opportunity may be a long time coming.
Algerian women are learning this difficult lesson even today.
C. PERSONAL STATUS LAWS
Marriage and divorce are key issues in the Middle East. As previously expressed
in the individual case studies, personal status laws fell under the jurisdiction of the
religious courts. Feminists suffer a great disadvantage in this system because of its
discriminatory nature toward women's place in society.
Civil intervention on behalf of personal status laws that raise women's status in
society disturbs the balance that the regime holds with the religious establishment.
Although creating a bitter competition between these two sectors, women's groups want
the personal status laws to fall under civil court jurisdiction, reasoning that they will be
treated as an equal citizen under the law.
D. REGIME DECISIONS
When a regime decides to expand women's rights, it risks assault from another
group, namely the Islamists. This scenario does not present a problem until the
government loses influence over popular political support for it and faces the reality of its
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demise. At this point, the political authority can choose one of two options in order to
maintain power—incorporate or marginalize the Islamist threat.
Jordan's parliamentary elections of 1989 are a case in point. Economic crisis in
the country forced King Hussein to implement austerity measures as dictated by the
World Bank, including the elimination of subsidies on Jordanian commodities. When
riots broke out in the country as a result, Jordan presented liberal political reforms in
order to quell the population. The parliamentary elections served as a vehicle for people
to express opinions of whom they thought best represented them. Surprising many, the
Islamists won the largest block of parliamentary seats while many government-supported
candidates lost their seats, sending a clear message to the monarchy (Gallagher, 1995, p.
221). In the successive parliamentary election of 1993, Islamists lost half of their seats
due to a change in the voting procedure. Even though the regime had tolerated and
incorporated the Islamists for four years, it nonetheless looked for an avenue to
marginalize them at the first chance.
In conclusion, when regime liberalization occurs, there are several variables that
determine the extent to which women can successfully use this period of instability to
promote feminist issues. If they are not organized into cohesive groups with an agenda
specifically focused on women's liberation, their demands are more easily ignored by the
political authority. As I have argued, the consolidated movement has at its roots a class
of university-educated, professional women who are able to mobilize women across
social class cleavages into a consolidated front demanding their emancipation. The next
chapter will present development of the Palestinian women's movement in order to set up
its evaluation against the aforementioned criteria.
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IV. THE PALESTINIAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
This chapter focuses on women's political activism in the Occupied Territories
during the Palestinian uprising known as the Intifada. Recalling the important factors that
influenced the MENA case studies, I will tailor the Palestinian discussion with them in
mind. The first variable is the integration of women into the education system. As
previously stated, a feminist movement in the region draws its leadership from the middle
class, university-educated segment of its female population. The second part is the ability
of these women to consolidate and generate support across class lines for social change,
differing from the initial women's movements that served a purely charitable function.
The final factor is the environment in which this women's movement arises. If it is
subordinate to a national movement or dictated and regulated by the government, the
movement will most likely be unsuccessful.
Before endeavoring to explain the causes of participation on the part of Palestinian
women, there are numerous factors to take into consideration. First, as implied by its
name, the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain under the occupation of
Israel and are therefore unable to function as an autonomous entity. Thus, the women's
movement is contained within the framework of a larger struggle for national
independence. Next, the Occupied Territories are separated geographically by Israel.
This division lends to a greater variance in economic, political, and cultural conditions and
experiences for each region than might be found in a contiguous geographic area. To
further complicate the issue, a significant number of Palestinians are dispersed throughout
the Middle East, the ramifications of which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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The dynamics of the above considerations make the issue of women and politics in
the Occupied Territories a difficult one to broach. This notwithstanding, this chapter will
illustrate the social conditions and institutions that allowed Palestinian women the ability
to have a political impact on the Intifada. Specifically, I examine the development of
educational opportunities and the formation of structured socio-political organizations that
provided women with a venue to attach gender issues to the national movement with
greater weight and legitimacy than during prior movements.
Most scholars agree that the expansion of educational opportunity coupled with
the capability of women's committees to mobilize grassroots support are the main
reasons the Palestinian feminist movement gained momentum and publicity during the
Intifada. Ten years later, however, the debate still exists as to whether or not women
should pursue equal rights in conjunction with the national struggle. The alternative is for
women to support national independence in the belief that after the Palestinians have a
state, their rights will be properly recognized. An expansion of this argument will be
presented in Chapter V.
One final task before proceeding is to offer a working definition of political
participation. For my purposes, this concept is determined on two levels: mass
participation and organized institutional involvement. Because a woman's political
activity may be constrained by a variety of factors—freedom of movement, household
obligations, or patriarchal limitations, to name a few—it is necessary to distinguish, yet
include, both levels of participation in order to fully comprehend the extent to which
women were politically effective during the Intifada.
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A. EDUCATION
Joost R. Hiltermann, in his study of the labor and women's movements in the
Occupied Territories, points out two structural conditions that account for a change in
outlook lending to the politicization of Palestinian women. One of these conditions is
their increased access to education after 1967, and so the chapter begins with education
as the precursor to modem socio-political activism (Hiltermann, 1991, p. 4). According
to a FAFO study, education is seen as a durable, but moveable asset that can be used in
whatever circumstances a person eventually finds him or herself in, in order to gain social
standing and economic well-being. Education also makes the boundaries of local
communities increasingly porous and the hold of traditional local elites more tenuous
(Heiberg, FAFO Study 151, Online). This view of education holds true for the Occupied
Territories although, as in the other MENA countries, marriage often supercedes
education as the avenue for social mobility for Palestinian women.
Until 1967 the educational systems of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were
administered by two independent states, Jordan and Egypt, respectively. The Israeli
occupation further complicated the system; it kept the current administrations but added
its own restrictions—bans on Palestinian history in textbooks, controls over the hiring of
teachers, and jurisdiction over financing the schools (Heiberg, FAFO Study 151, Online).
Nonetheless, the construction of new academic institutions proceeded fervently. For
example, from 1967 to 1968, West Bank schools numbered just over 800. Currently,
over 1300 schools exist. The same pattern is seen in Gaza, where the number of schools
has increased from 1 66 in 1 967 to approximately 340 today (Heiberg, FAFO Study 151,
Online). It is important to note that there are three different types of schools in the
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Occupied Territories (government schools, UNRWA schools and private schools), and
the education afforded in each varies.
After Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 war, it
tolerated the dramatic expansion of the education system in the territories, especially in
the founding of new universities (Robinson, 1997, p. 20). No longer a luxury for the
notable elite, who were the only ones that could afford to send their children abroad for
schooling, education was now accessible to the middle and lower classes. With the
location of schools so close to home, student enrollment mushroomed in as little as
decade. According to Glenn E. Robinson, during the 1977 school year, Palestinian
university students numbered 2,601. Only ten years later, nearly 16,000 students were
enrolled in the universities (Robinson, 1997, p. 20).
The inclusion of women in this change cannot be overestimated. An important
breakthrough, Palestinian universities allowed for a dramatic increase in the education of
women. With this development, a new consciousness emerged. Women began
participating in student unions whose ideologies paralleled the major nationalist factions
of the PLO (Robinson, 1997, p. 22). Membership in these academically-based groups
led Palestinian women to greater political awareness and activism, as well as to assume
greater political responsibilities.
One statistic that confirms the increase of educated women is to compare the
gender gap for educational attainment in the Occupied Territories. According to the 1992
FAFO study, the gender gap for number of completed school years was markedly
reduced over a few decades. To clarify this point, Palestinians aged 50 to 59 were at
university age from 1940 to 1950. The gender gap in this group reflected only nineteen
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percent of women educated to the same level as men. In one decade, the gender gap
closed to 39 percent for those aged 40 to 49. The most dramatic reductions are seen in
the next two age brackets, with 83 percent of women attaining men's education levels in
those aged 30 to 39, and an impressive 96 percent for those aged 20 to 29 (Heiberg,
FAFO Study 151, Online). By examining these numbers, one can conclude that the
access to educational opportunities opened markedly in about two generations.
Moreover, these statistics confirm the dramatic impact of university education
opportunities available to women starting in the 1970s. There are however, some
remaining roadblocks to education.
Affecting both genders was the closing of all educational institutions by Israel in
response to the Intifada. Robinson provides a detailed account of the impacts of the
academic closure on the Palestinians, during which time many communities attempted to
create an informal education system in place of schools. Israel claimed that they had
become "centers for organizing and stimulating violence" and especially for the
universities, this was true (Robinson, 1997, p. 101). In dismantling the universities,
students no longer had a forum in which to formulate political strategy. Women were hit
particularly hard; without the student unions, they were left with little choice but to seek
another avenue—the socio-political organizations—to develop and exercise their political
activism.
More specifically to women is the societal pressure to marry and begin raising a
family. Marriage is another inhibiting factor for women pursuing higher education.
First, advanced education for women continues to meet a certain societal resistance.
Many families fear that attendance at co-educational institutions can lead women into
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situations that may have the potential to reflect poorly on family honor. More
importantly, the traditional expectation of women is that their ultimate fulfillment comes
through marriage and children, not education. Among many Palestinians, advanced
education for women is often viewed as an impediment to marriage. It is the roles
obtainable through marriage, rather than opportunities opened by education, that
primarily define a woman's place in Palestinian society (Heiberg, FAFO Study 151,
Online). Thus, advanced education for women functions to reduce the chances of
marriage for at least two reasons. First, advanced education delays the age of marriage
for a woman, particularly since in Palestinian society it is not acceptable for a woman to
be both married and a student. Second, the percentage of men with equal or higher
education is significantly reduced (Heiberg, FAFO Study 151, Online). In Palestinian
and most societies around the world, a man is less likely to marry a woman who is more
educated than he, thus lowering the potential suitors for a university-educated woman.
Another interesting statistic of the FAFO study examined the impact of the
father's or husband's education regarding the latitude a woman might have in pursuance
of employment. The study found that a large majority of women thought it was
acceptable to be employed outside the home. However, since authority in these matters is
normally the prerogative of men, it tends to be men's attitudes that determine whether or
not women are actually free to seek employment. The implication of these two factors
suggests that a woman's ability to participate in the public domain might be affected to a
much greater degree by the education of her father or husband rather than by her own
educational level (Heiberg, FAFO Study 151, Online).
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B. SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Before delving into the women's committees of the Intifada, it is important to
note the roots of the women's movement in Palestine, and later, the Occupied Territories.
The birth of the movement was during the 1920s as a result of economic and social
changes set into motion by the opposing forces of colonialism and nationalism. The
inhabitants of Palestine were protesting the rapid influx of Jewish settlers on their land.
At the same time, the ideology of Zionism also introduced the concept of Arab
nationalism to an otherwise clan-based population. Women's leadership came from
exactly the same class that produced the leadership for the national movement: the class
of urban traders and urban-based, absentee landowners (Hiltermann, 1991, p. 128).
During the period of the British Mandate, activist women were typically those who had
the opportunity to receive education or who were related in some way to men active in
political life from wealthy, prominent Palestinian families (Khamisin, 1989, p. 178).
Such women were usually the wives or sisters of nationalist leaders. To characterize the
activities of the Palestinian women, Hiltermann offers this comparison:
Whereas in other Arab countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, early
women's organizations fought for such typically socio-political demands
as the abolition of polygamy and for the right to vote, in Palestine women
demanded that the Balfour Declaration be revoked, that Jewish
immigrations to Palestine be restricted and that Palestinian political
prisoners receive better treatment (Hiltermann, 1991, p. 128).
Although also displayed as described above, the role of women during the Mandate
period was usually limited to relief work in times of crisis.
From 1948 to 1967, when Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt governed
the Gaza Strip, and Egyptian rule over the Gaza Strip, women's activities did not
politically accompany nationalist or gender issues. Women proved fundamental in the
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establishment of charitable organizations such as orphanages or centers for the elderly,
but did so within the framework of existing religious institutions (Hiltermann, 1991, p.
129). They provided important services to the community that were otherwise neglected
by the Jordanian and Egyptian governments.
Politics began working its way back into the women's movement with the
founding of the Palestinian Women's Association (PWA) in the West Bank in 1964.
Hiltermann cites the PWA as an ideological precursor of the modern women's movement
in the West Bank (Hiltermann, 1991, p. 131). The PWA sent women as delegates to the
first Palestinian National Council meeting. The following year the General Union of
Palestinian Women (GUPW) was established as the women's branch of the PLO. Still,
after 1967 and beginning of the occupation, the major framework for women's
organization and activity remained in the over one hundred traditional charitable societies
located in the towns. As previously noted, the these organizations espoused national and
charitable sentiments led by urban middle-class women who served the rural and refugee
poor, but largely without their participation (Giacaman, 1989, p. 160).
In' ash Al-Usra was one such charitable organization. Founded in 1965 in
response to pressing social needs, one of the group's guiding principles since 1967 has
been "to train women, employ them in productive activities, and pay them for their work,
especially in the production of traditional wares that do not compete with Israeli goods"
(Hiltermann, 1991, p. 131). Women would produce and sell intricate Palestinian
embroidery or authentic Palestinian baked goods. In'ash Al-Usra typified this generation
of organizations, whose goal was to provide a means for women to earn an income but
did little to educate and empower women politically (Hiltermann, 1991, p. 130).
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Nevertheless, Hiltermann stresses the importance of these charitable organizations, as
they were the springboard for the activists of today.
During the 1970s, a new generation of women emerged. Many of them had been
politicized in the student movements at Palestinian universities and took part in the
voluntary work committees. The Voluntary Works Program, founded in 1972, was a
group of factional grassroots organizations that promoted health care, agricultural relief,
and women's rights (Robinson, 1997, p. 29). Using these projects to reach out to the
community, the Voluntary Works Program helped to mobilize a broad national
constituency that to this point remained undeveloped. Economically, the program had
little impact, but socially it bridged the gap between the urban and rural elements of
society. Robinson emphasizes the importance of this interaction, stating, "By minimizing
urban-rural class divides, Palestinians were actively engaging and consolidating a
national Palestinian consciousness..." (Robinson, 1997, p. 30).
The establishment of the new grassroots women's committees emulated the
changes in the greater movement. In contrast to the charitable women's organizations,
the new groups sought to involve the majority of women in the West Bank who lived in
villages, along with women in camps (Giacaman, 1989, p. 158). The urban poor, women
workers, intellectuals and urban middle-class women joined together in a united women's
movement. Three of the four major committees articulated a program of improving
women's status in society, although national liberation remained the overriding concern.
The result was a partially legal socio-political movement consisting of institutions
and popular organizations set up by local activists who attempted "to mobilize the
Palestinian masses by offering them services that were otherwise not available, while
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articulating nationalist concerns and aspirations as part of their day-to-day work"
(Hiltermann, 1991, p. 5). By integrating the two objectives and promulgating them in one
committee, these groups provided the local institutional infrastructure as well as the
leadership for the uprising that began in December 1987.
Hiltermann evaluates the Palestinian movement by examining whether or not it
met several of the prerequisites for successful mobilization and collective action as put
forth by Jeffrey Paige in Agrarian Revolution. Paige's first condition is the presence of
political structures that can provide the organizational and ideological framework for the
popular movement (As cited in Hiltermann, 1991, p. 8). Hiltermann believes this is
exemplified in the Palestine Liberation Organization and its institutions. Next, Paige
calls for the blurring of class lines, as demonstrated in the unification of rural and urban
elements of society. Hiltermann and Robinson clearly state that a development of a new
elite, urbanization, and education helped to consolidate social classes among the
Palestinians. At the end of the 1970's, a generation of women was coming of age,
entering universities or the labor force and attempting to make their voices heard in the
established organizations (Hiltermann, 1991, p. 131). Thus, women were included in the
mobilization and politicization process that led to the Intifada.
In March of 1978, the Palestinian Union of Women's Work Committee
(PUWWC), fractured into four groups representing the ideological divisions within the
Palestinian movement: the Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees
(FPWAC) and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Union of Palestinian
Working Women's Committees (UPWWC) and Palestinian Communist Party; the Union
of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC) and Popular Front for the Liberation of
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Palestine; and finally the Women's Committee for Social Work (Holt, 1992, p. 40). The
founders of the first network of women's groups were graduates of Bir Zeit University
and other professional women, but soon the movement included working women
(Hiltermann, 1991, p. 28).
While many of activities of the committees are not explicitly political, the self-
organization of the community and the encouragement to become somewhat self-
sufficient make the neighborhood committees political instruments, as shown by Israel's
ban on them in 1988. Aside from their own committees, women also had influence in the
popular committees. Giacaman writes:
They are active in the medical relief committees which gather information
about people's blood and pass the information onto the hospitals. Women
form the majority in the education committees which organize alternative
studies since the Israelis closed the schools. The aid committees go to
areas which are under curfew or siege and distribute food, money, and
moral support. The Israelis have difficulty in dealing with the committees
because they involve women, and not just those who are involved in
political groups (Giacaman, 1989, p. 156).
However, women's organizations were in many ways lagging, being in part miniature
versions of those of the men. Women struggled to formulate a disassociated platform
that defined gender-based issues outside of the context of the national cause (Giacaman,
1989, p. 156). This was a feat to be overcome only with the signing of the Declaration of
Principles in 1993.
Women's political action has passed through three phases, roughly in parallel
with the stages of the uprising itself. First were the mass confrontations with the Israeli
army: sit-ins, barricade-building, and demonstrations. The second phase composed of
building and consolidation of the network of neighborhood and popular committees that
were declared illegal on 18 August 1988. Finally, the movement looked for ways in
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which women could consolidate the gains of the uprising to achieve permanent changes
in the social and political status of women. In essence, the movement went from
reactionary to forward-looking (Giacaman, 1989, pp. 166-7).
For their part, approximately three hundred women were detained for at least a
day over the course of the uprising in the first year. This compares to about 20,000 men
detained during the outbreak of the Intifada (Giacaman, 1989, p. 162). With so many
men under detention, women have been propelled into new political roles to fill the void.
Also, women have expanded their motherly role beyond the family in a greater sense to
that of the community. In this respect, women have enlarged their traditional role rather
than adopting a completely new role. With this change came greater obligations, such as
visiting the sick and wounded of the Intifada (Giacaman, 1989, p. 161).
C. THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT AFTER OSLO
The signing of the Declaration of Principles in September of 1993 essentially
ended the Intifada. With this chapter of history closing, women's organizations took the
opportunity to redefine their goals and focus their energy on developing an agenda
independent of the national movement. Palestinian women were now able to articulate
views and adopt strategies that distinctly differed from those assumed to coincide with
the promotion of Palestinian independence. Immediately their program was more clearly
defined: they were directly concerned with women's liberation and the promotion of
women's rights, a shift in strategy from that during the Intifada (Abdulhadi, 1998, p. 1).
In 1988, attempts were made by academic feminists and by women's bureaus of
the Popular Front, Democratic Front, and the Palestinian People's Party to put to practice
a celebrated passage from the Declaration of Palestinian Independence that pledged
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nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, race religion, or political affiliation. This spurred
the discussion of a new social code in the form of three distinct drafts of the "Declaration
of Principles of Palestinian Women's Rights" circulating in 1993. The GUPW, with
support from other women's groups, took the initiative to announce their declaration in
August 1994 irrespective of the Palestinian Authority's perspective on the matter
(Abdulhadi, 1998, p. 5).
The 1990s opened a window of opportunity for Palestinian women to implement
their agenda. The first step was to formulate a strategy addressing specifically feminist
concerns. As in most Arab countries, personal affairs in the Occupied Territories
continue to be regulated by religious codes. Whereas civil laws applied to various state
and community affairs, most of the Arab countries ran their "personal" affairs on the
basis of Islamic law or modifications thereof (Dajani, 1994, p. 2). One of the main goals
of the Palestinian women's movement is stimulate change in personal status laws. They
want to abolish polygamy and initiate other changes in the areas of marriage, divorce,
inheritance, and child custody. Rabiha Diab, the president of the Social Work
Association affiliated with Fateh said in 1994, "We want the Palestinian state to be the
second Arab state, after Tunisia, to make polygamy illegal. If we don't change this law
now, we won't be able to do it for 50 years" (Dajani, 1994, p. 3)
Besides seeking revisions in personal status laws, Palestinian women are pushing
for more representation in their political parties and in the new government. One of the
key vehicles for achieving this goal is the Women's Affairs Technical Committee, which
operates under the auspices of the Orient House. The Technical Committee includes
representatives from the three political parties that support the Israel-PLO Declaration of
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Principles—Fateh, FIDA, and the Palestinian People's Party—as well as politically
independent academics and professionals. (Horan, 1 996, Online)
Already organized and clear about their objectives, activists have a long list of
demands for the Palestine Legislative Council. First, they called for the minimum age of
eighteen to be set for marriage. These women also wanted the government to provide
mandatory education for women through secondary school (Horan, 1996, Online).
The debate continues between feminism and nationalism. Women are
encountering problems in their attempts to disassociate feminism from the greater
national struggle. Nevertheless, activist women are on the ground promoting and
instituting change in the Palestinian provisional government. When speaking of the
modern women's movement in the Occupied Territories, one must address the primary
role of Palestinian women in the national movement, but include attempts to place
women's issues on the national agenda. Hiltermann warns that "proletarianization in and
of itself does not necessarily lead to a woman's liberation from the restrictive bonds of
family and community" (Hiltermann, 1991, p. 35). It is with this in mind that Palestinian
women seek to learn from the experiences of their Arab and Muslim sisters around the
region in order to most effectively balance the establishment of an independent state with
their attempts to institutionalize positive changes on the feminist front.
D. CONCLUSIONS
In the Palestinian case, I observed that it also followed the trends described in
Chapters II and III. Specifically, Palestinian women were incorporated into the
educational system beginning in the 1970s. At the outbreak of the Intifada, these women
were leading socio-political organizations that were able to reach a broad cross-section of
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society and instill their members with nationalistic pride. In this sense, the women's
associations were one of the primary reasons that the Intifada was capable of sustained
action against Israel. For the women themselves, however, it was not until the signing of
the Declaration of Priniciples that they could pursue a feminist agenda outside the
auspices of the Palestinian national movement. In this respect, the women are fortunate
that the national struggle did not directly result in an independent state. This delay gives
the movement more time to organize and to build a following in support of women's
rights upon the establishment of Palestine. One could speculate that ifwomen in Algeria
or Egypt had realized that their efforts in a national independence movement would go
unrecognized, they may have appreciated an opportunity like the women in the Occupied
Territories are currently experiencing.
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V. PROSPECTS FOR AUTHORITY IN PALESTINE
A major difference between the Palestinian case and the other countries presented
is that the Palestinians do not officially have a state. This is one of the key variables
—
political environment—absent from a comprehensive understanding of the development
of a Palestinian women's movement and an inherent challenge to this study. It is
important to evaluate the current political structure in place in the Occupied Territories in
order to appreciate the challenges women in a future Palestine will face. The most likely
avenue for this to occur is through a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian peace
negotiations rather than in a repeated attempt at revolution, like that of the Intifada. With
democratic structures in place in the form of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian
Legislative Council, popular opinion impacts the character of the provisional government
by way of elections, a practice that will likely continue after achieving autonomy. The
result of the democratic nature of this political system is that the public will determine
who holds authority in the new state, a consideration that strongly affects the continuation
of a women's movement in Palestine.
One method to project the political composition of a future Palestinian state is to
determine the depth of support for two competing factions, namely the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas. One hypothesis holds that it is inversely
correlated, i.e., that popular support for Hamas increases when the peace process between
the PLO and Israel is deteriorating or at a standstill, and vice versa. The general question
driving this chapter is: When has popular support for Hamas been the strongest among
Palestinians during the peace process? This information may be useful to predict under
what circumstances Hamas could generate a large enough following to threaten the
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Arafat regime, thereby forcing him to consider consolidating forces with them; the by-
product of such an alliance would be a concession on controversial issues, i.e., women's
organizations and personal status laws.
To formulate an answer, I empirically tested this question using public opinion
poll data collected by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) and the
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) between 1993 and 1999. My
intention is to present evidence suggesting that despite the competition for political
support between Fateh and Hamas, political affiliation and participation is founded on a
principle even more basic than ideology—the perception that politics will serve as a
means to end the occupation. I discovered that support for either group was offset by a
response of "I trust no one" or "no opinion." After compiling the data, this variable stood
out as more telling of public support for the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations than a
factional division. Potential explanations for this occurrence are explored in the findings
section of this chapter.
A. METHODOLOGY
In order to answer my question, I relied heavily on data compiled by the CPRS
and JMCC, organizations which conducted regular public opinion polls in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip from 1993 to 1999. The JMCC performed 33 polls from which I used
four applicable questions over time; twelve questions were taken from the CPRS's 45
polls. Not every question was asked repeatedly over time, and all data is available on the
Internet via each agency's website.
A note must be made with regard to polling error. Confidence level and margin
of error were the same for both agencies, with a confidence level of 95 percent and a
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margin of error of plus or minus three percent. Two types of specific error cautioned by
CPRS were sampling error and non-response error. Inherent to conducting polls,
sampling error occurred because they were not administered to the entire population, but
rather to sample groups reflecting a cross-section of society. Non-response error is a
consideration in that if a respondent did not provide an answer to a question, his opinion
went unrecorded but he remained statistically significant as a member of the polled
population.
In order to coordinate the wealth of information contained in the polls, this
chapter is organized into two phases. Starting at the micro level, I describe the trends
observed in each of the questions over time as dictated by the individual studies.
Continuing to the macro level, I synthesize the variables in light of major events during
the negotiations to gain a "big picture" perspective of the dynamic between the peace
process and political participation. Finally, I consider the implications of my findings
with respect to the initial question driving this research.
B. EFFECTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS ON PALESTINIAN POLITICS
Basic indicators of political affiliation and support were examined in twelve
separate poll questions. Three major themes emerged: 1) legitimacy of the current
political institutions, e.g., Fateh, the PA, and Arafat; 2) validity of opposition groups,
especially Hamas; and 3) apathy of respondents with "no opinion." The questions
provided information regarding support for the current peace negotiations, participation
in Palestinian elections, and approval for armed attacks on Israeli targets. Other
questions looked more specifically at support for a particular faction, trust in a certain
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personality, and evaluation of performances by the Palestinian Authority, Arafat, and
opposition groups.
The first question I considered was: "Do you support the current peace
negotiations?" This was asked by both polling agencies and indicates a general opinion
toward the peace process from the Palestinian perspective. A majority of the population
voiced its support for the negotiations over time: the average figure over time was 66.9
percent in the JMCC polls and 76.4 percent in the CPRS polls. These averages differ
largely due to the fact that the agencies did not conduct their polls in the same months,
and sentiment recorded in one month may change drastically because of events unfolding
in the next month.
The most pronounced support for the peace process in the CPRS polls came in
June 1996. A major event preceding this poll and potentially prompting such a high
response was the Palestinian National Council's twenty-first session in April when it
approved amending clauses calling for the destruction of Israel in the national charter and
also endorsed the formation of a new Palestinian government (CPRS Poll 23, June 1996).
In this case support may reflect a sense of improvement in the transition toward
autonomy as well as trust in the Palestinian government. Conversely, support for the
peace process was at its lowest of 60.2 percent in April 1997. This upturn was
accompanied by an increased level of support for suicide bombings against Israeli targets.
In November 1998, support peaked at 75.2 percent following a stable trend in previous
months. This could be attributed to the negotiations culminating in the Wye
Memorandum, confirming public approval of the breakthrough.
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To the question "How do you view the future for Palestinians?" respondents were
given the options of optimism, pessimism, and no answer. The data shows that
historically, optimism prevailed at an average of 65.5 percent. Confidence saw its
highest levels in the months after the signing of the Taba accord in September 1995,
rising 31.5 percent from September to October alone. Pessimism, however, also enjoyed
its turn in the spotlight. After the Hebron massacre, a 14.5 percent increase in pessimism
was reported in the CPRS poll of March 1994. Another dramatic rise in pessimism
followed the Hasmonean Tunnel clash of 24 September 1996, when Israel revealed a new
exit onto the Via Delorosa and was met with violent confrontation (Bickerton, 1998, pp.
302-203).
The next topic indicates declared support for a faction or a personality. The
factions charted here are Fateh, Hamas, National Independents, and "no one." Public
opinion for these groups constantly fluctuated over time. I omitted the responses for
other political parties for two reasons: 1) support registered by respondents was not
statistically significant; and 2) support for these groups remained fairly consistent.
As expected, the backing for Fateh stood far above that for any other group. The
declines seen in January 1994, March 1995, and December 1997 are attributed to
unstable conditions in the Occupied Territories and the perception of unfulfilled political
and economic expectations after the signing of the DOP. For example, the CPRS poll in
January 1994 was conducted after the killing of five Palestinians by the Israeli military in
Hebron and Gaza (CPRS Poll 5, 1994). A decline in support for Fateh may also reflect a
temporary disillusionment with the group but did not necessarily translate into an
increase in the popularity of opposition groups. In fact, Hamas experiences relatively
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stable support, albeit minimal when compared to that of Fateh. March 1996 marked the
beginning of the decrease to current levels for Hamas, and may be due to suicide
bombings it claimed responsibility for against Israeli targets at a time when opposition to
such attacks was at a peak.
Between June 1998 and December 1999, the largest group competing with Fateh
is that of "no one." According to JMCC data, this response peaked at eleven percent in
August 1 999, when the peace process was at a freeze. Concomitantly, support for both
Fateh and Hamas fell by over five percent each. The fluctuation of the unemployment
rate, a falling evaluation of Arafat's performance, and a perception of increased
corruption in the PA may illustrate a waning support for the current political process.
Support for a specific personality was register in two different forms. The CPRS
study asked who someone would elect as president of the PA, whereas the JMCC asked
which personality someone trusted most. Options included Arafat, Yassin (figurehead
for Hamas), no opinion, and no one, although this last response was not available in the
CPRS studies until the December poll of 1995. The JMCC approach of asking which
Palestinian figure did one most trust yielded results must the same as the CPRS study.
For the presidency, support for Arafat steadily declined while support for Yassin
decreased between November 1994 and March 1995. A major event that occurred during
this time was the signing of a formal treaty between Israel and Jordan in October. The
Palestinian public may have looked to Jordan to progress their issues, resulting in a
decline in support for both Arafat and Yassin.
In May of 1995, however, the opposite is true. Support for Arafat had declined
7.2 percent from its peak one year earlier; a 6.1 percent increase for Yassin followed in
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July 1995 over the same period. This may be a result of the Palestinian Authority's
crackdown on Islamic Jihad in February, when it used Palestinian police forces to arrest
some members of PIJ for armed attacks against Israeli targets (Bickerton, 1998, pp. 302-
303). Support for Yassin went down from December 1995 to June 1998. Although
Yassin was arrested by Israel in 1991 and later released to Jordan in October 1997, there
is no correlation between these dates and public support for him. The downtrend in
public support for him may have been caused by a general fear to voice support for
Islamic groups as a result of the internal crackdowns.
After identifying which political faction Palestinians supported, the next two
questions explored by CPRS dealt with the degree of legitimacy given to both the current
political administration and opposition groups. The first is a general question asking the
respondent if he will participate in elections. This data was collected from December
1993 until October 1995, only months before the Palestinian legislative elections held on
20 January 1996. A significant majority confirmed that it would participate, averaging at
71.9 percent.
The second question presented a dilemma: "If the opposition called for a boycott
of the elections, what would you do?" Responses were to boycott the elections,
participate despite the boycott, and unsure. Nearly 60 percent of the replies were to
participate in the elections, indicating that the weight given to the electoral process far
outweighed that given to the opposition. From December 1994 to December 1995, the
support for participation in elections rose fourteen percent, while support for the boycott
decreased from 26.6 to only 13.8 percent. Coupled with the preceding data, it is apparent
that Palestinians hold the electoral process in high esteem.
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The next indicators of support for the existing political structure were the
perceived performance of President Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, respectively.
Both agencies included these questions in their polls, although the extent to which they
did so varied. In the case of charting Arafat's performance, the studies overlapped:
JMCC data ranged from April 1996 to March 1999, while CPRS figures start in January
1994 and end October 1999. The data measuring the PA's performance is limited by
CPRS to one year, from December 1994 to September 1995, when JMCC picked up the
issue from April 1996 through August 1999.
The perception of Arafat's performance elicited similar responses in both studies.
A rating of "good" reached its peak in April 1 997, followed by a sharp decrease until
September 1997, down 18.3 percent in JMCC polls and 15.3 percent in the CPRS polls.
The intensification of Israeli settlement policies, particularly on Mount Abu Ghniem
(known to Israelis as Har Homa), and Arafat's inability to halt this process explain the
downturn (Bickerton, 1998, p. 304). From October 1998 to October 1999, Arafat's
"good" appraisal stabilized around 54 percent. Unfortunately, neither study provided
data after this date for one to observe public response to Arafat after signing the Wye
Memorandum.
The approval rating for effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority has also
gradually depreciated over time. CPRS data shows slightly lower percentages and is
measured only a year after its institution in December 1994 through September 1995,
prior to the legislative elections. This precedes JMCC questioning, which began in April
1996. In April 1997, the PA enjoyed high public sentiment at 71.4 percent, as did Arafat.
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Since then, it has steadily decreased fifteen percent, reflected in figures posted in the
JMCC poll of August 1999.
Only documented by CPRS, the question of the performance of opposition groups
is an interesting one. Responses of "good" and "poor" started off relatively close, at 35.8
percent and 28.2 percent, respectively. Over time the good rating increased while the
poor rating decreased, with the maximum separation noted in June 1998. A possible
explanation for the positive response is Yassin's activism after being released to Jordan
from an Israeli prison in 1997. He immediately met with the Hamas leadership in
Amman, and later embarked on a four-month tour ending in June 1998 to strengthen
regional support for the movement (Kristiansen, 1999, p. 31). With the conclusion of the
tour came a decrease in public opinion for opposition groups, leveling at approximately
33 percent as of October 1999.
The next questions refocus attention on the Palestinian Authority and pertain to
corruption. The first issue is whether or not the respondent believes corruption exists in
the PA. Averaging 62.2 percent responding "yes," a significant majority perceive
deterioration in the institution. Specific peaks occurred in April and June 1999 at over 70
percent, and the lows were registered from September to December 1996, August 1998,
and January 1999 at around 50 percent. In each case, the unemployment rate was up.
There was also the downtrend of support for Arafat's performance.
When asked if corruption would increase or decrease in the future, most
respondents felt it would increase over time. In May 1997 there was a dramatic rise in
the group who felt it would increase. A significant decrease followed in October 1998,
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with a continuing increase charted in the latest polls. The signing of the Wye
Memorandum may attribute to the sentiment that corruption would decrease.
The next issue is another indicator used to determine support for opposition
groups. Respondents were asked whether or not they supported armed attacks on Israeli
targets. This variable was definitely driven by events of the day. The peak of support in
February 1995 followed suicide bombings that resulted in the deaths of 22 Israelis and
the internal crackdown on militant opposition groups by the Palestinian Authority.
Opposition to the attacks was most significant in December 1996, when unemployment
was at a low. The current trend indicates a decline, with Palestinians opposing armed
attacks on Israeli targets.
C. FINDINGS
The past six years since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September
1993 have been a roller-coaster ride of sorts for the peace process. Palestinian public
opinion has fluctuated accordingly. Although there is less data available in the early
polling years, the questioning becomes more consistent over time and allows for better
statistical analysis. This information is used to draw parallels between public opinion and
the peace process in order to determine which factors influence popular support for the
Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas. Over time, the relationship of different
variables shifted away from an inverse correlation between popular support for the PLO
and that for Hamas. When the peace process began, the poll data indicated that backing
for one group depended on whether or not the negotiations were on track. As time
progressed, more and more respondents began to express the view of "no opinion."
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This lack of opinion, whether out of fear or apathy, is especially important
because it reveals the general perception that no current political faction has the means to
effect real change on the final status for the state of Palestine. A pattern described by
CPRS as "tri-polar" is developing amongst the Palestinian electorate. The first group is
comprised of DOP supporters, namely those associated with Fateh. The next segment is
the DOP opposition groups led by Hamas. "Swing voters" make up the third group and
is largely composed of those who are unwilling to commit to one of the other two groups.
Neither of the first two has successfully formulated a strategy to elicit the support of the
third. If and when the Palestinians secure a state, however, these groups may shift into
more solid coalitions, the implications of which will surely pose a challenge to the
women's movement.
D. THE FUTURE FOR PALESTINIAN FEMINISTS
There are two viable scenarios that will potentially emerge in Palestine on the
political scene. The first is a continuation and extension of power under Arafat and the
Palestine Liberation Organization. The second is a coalition government wherein Arafat
co-opts Hamas for support. Either situation would be confirmed by the Palestinian
population through the electoral process. Since implementation, Palestinians have
expressed their opinion that elections are the best way to decide who gets into office, thus
validating the process through participation. Support for a particular regime translates
into votes, which equals an electoral recognition of power.
The lack of opinion on key political issues, as shown in the previous chapter,
suggests that Arafat will remain in power regardless of the coalition he forms within the
Palestinian government. His popularity ranges between fifty and sixty percent among the
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constituents, with no other personality or opposition group close to competing with him
for power. The Islamists form the next sizeable minority, but their inability to
consolidate beyond factional lines prevents them from threatening Arafat's authority.
Hamas could draw support from Islamic independents, but an even more powerful
opposition would be in the coalition among the opposition groups, including Hamas, the
PFLP, the DFLP, and Islamic Jihad. The difficulty lies in generating enough appeal to
cross divisional lines separating these groups.
These scenarios aside, a more probable sequence of events would be Arafat's
co-optation of Hamas. Hamas has extensive reach across Palestinian society, catering to
the needs to the population through a vast network of mosques, schools, and other social
institutions. Unfortunately for them, the group has marginalized itself by its boycott of
elections, with candidates from the group running on an independent ticket. Nonetheless,
when Hamas decides to participate, it may generate a considerable amount of votes. It
will not be enough to unseat Arafat, but it will threaten the balance of power. In turn,
Arafat may decide to integrate Hamas into the Palestinian Authority, giving the group
more influence in religious and social matters in exchange for their recognition of him as
the rightful leader.
Neither scenario holds much promise for the future with respect to the Palestinian
women's movement. While the political context prior to and during the Intifada was
quite fluid and enabled women to organize, such fluidity has ceased under the self-rule of
the Palestinian Authority. Another alarming sign to women is the possible alignment
between the Palestinian Authority and Islamist groups. Palestinian women expressed
well-founded fears that if the PLO is forced to come to terms with Hamas, a repetition of
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the 1989 hijab episode (when women in Gaza were forced to wear the traditional veil)
becomes possible. The sentiment is that if the PLO did not defend women during the
height of the Intifada, would it be realistic to expect it to act otherwise in a more benign
environment? (Abdulhadi, 1998, p. 4). Palestinian women also fear that their leadership
may simply emulate laws in force in Jordan once either autonomy or statehood is
achieved.
These concerns notwithstanding, it is reasonable to expect that the women's
movement in Palestine will fare better than those in the other cases. The reasons are
threefold. First, as I have shown, the women in the Occupied Territories have broken
through on the educational arena. As Figure 3 shows, in 1995, the gender gap in literacy
between men and women had closed significantly over the past twenty years.
Also, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Education
compiled information on the composition of enrolled students by gender. They found
that in the West Bank, there are almost equal levels of men and women enrolled in all
educational stages, including higher education, although a gender gap still remains in the
Gaza Strip.
Second, the vast network of women's organizations has survived the trials of the
Intifada and is still going strong today. In an effort to demonstrate its permanence on the
political scene, the movement re-evaluated its goals after Oslo to formulate a more
feminist-oriented agenda outside the nationalist struggle for independence. By
establishing itself as a concurrent rather than subordinate track to the nationalist
movement, the women's struggle has gained public attention and support for the
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Figure 3: Palestinian Gender Gap, 1995. From Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
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Finally, Palestinian women have the ability to learn from the past through
women's movements in other countries. There have been many conferences and
seminars sponsored by the United Nations in an effort to promote interaction among the
world's women. Global networking through these meetings allows Palestinian women to
discuss their movement with women around the world and to discover what has and has
not worked in other nations. This opportunity is tremendous in that it serves to break the
pattern I observed in the movements of Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan. The
celebration of International Women's Day provides another example of building
supportive vehicles to promote women's rights.
E. CONCLUSIONS
I have learned that the progression of women's movements in the Middle East
does in fact follow a logical pattern. It is through the institution of education, particularly
in university-level programs, that opens new doors for women. By rapidly expanding the
educational opportunities afforded its women, a country concomitantly transforms the
values and beliefs of the female population. This in turn encourages women to challenge
their place in the existing social order through the formation of socio-political
organizations. If these structures develop and consolidate prior to or immediately
following a period of regime liberalization, then the movement will more likely initiate
positive changes on its behalf. If, however, the regime successfully suppresses or co-opts
it, a feminist movement will have difficulty emerging or sustaining.
Palestinian women have been fortunate in that the political environment coincided
with the development of socio-political organizations. As I have shown in the cases of
Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Algeria, the timing of these two elements has not been
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optimal and as a result, societal changes for women have been slow to come. In Egypt,
for example, it was not until February 2000 that a woman gained the right to file for
divorce from her husband with or without his consent. Algerian women are not so
fortunate; they continue to battle Islamists over their position in society. Currently, under
the provisions of the 1984 Family Code, women in Algeria are recognized as minors.
This lack of recognized equality hinders the ability of women to meet in a public forum,
let alone organize a successful movement.
The future will be a difficult one for Palestinian women, whatever the regime
structure. This notwithstanding, they have a strength that prior movements in the region
lacked. With careful planning and consideration of the forces at work, the women's
movement in Palestine has the potential to set the example for a new feminism in the
Middle East. Unlike the others, where the government takes on the responsibilities for its
women or a women's movement fails to develop, the Palestinian women can change this





F Enrolled = Total number of females enrolled in schools
(pre-primary + primary + secondary + tertiary/higher)
# F Univ = Number of females enrolled in tertiary/higher education institutions
% F Total = Percentage of females enrolled in schools to total female population
% F Univ = Percentage of females enrolled in universities to total female population
F Pop. = Total female population
Egypt F Enrolled # F Univ % F Total % F Univ FPop.
1954 657906 13950 6.8 0.1 9602842
1957 886389 10410 9.2 0.1 11602842
1958 1015509 12079 7.9 0.09 12813049
1959 1129382 13797 8.8 0.12 12813049
1961 1242877 18190 9.7 0.14 12813049
1962 1274261 11814 9.8 0.09 12916089
1963 1424324 28412 11 0.2 12916089
1964 1552394 29264 10.4 0.19 12916089
1965 1661720 36850 11 0.25 14904107
1967 1764578 39029 11.8 0.26 14904107
1968 1816277 40507 12.1 0.27 14900304
1969 1878519 50606 12.6 0.34 14900304
1970 1958104 57901 13.1 0.39 14900304
1971 2061946 66536 13.8 0.45 14900304
1972 2197858 100944 14.8 0.68 14900304
1974 2369300 118853 13.2 0.66 17957276
1975 2475701 136577 13.8 0.76 17957276
Tunisia F Enrolled # F Univ % F Total % F Univ F Pop.
1954 76656 381 4.2 0.02 1825309
1956 106184 392 5.8 0.02 1825309
1957 108738 402 6 0.022 1825309
1961 177039 410 9.7 0.021 1825309
1962 175469 447 9.6 0.024 1825309
1963 232636 652 12.7 0.036 1825309
1965 252126 865 11.5 0.039 2189947
1966 255754 1195 11.7 0.055 2189947
1967 304370 1354 13.7 0.061 2218932
1968 351856 1631 15.9 0.073 2218932
1970 386645 17.4 2218932
1971 414958 2501 18.7 0.11 2218932
1974 416855 2330 18.8 2218932
1975 428026 4480 15.6 0.16 2747296
1976 447306 6070 16.3 0.22 2747296
1977 481290 6070 17.5 0.22 2747296
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Jordan F Enrolled # F Univ % F Total % F Univ F Pop.
1955 75666 11.6 654070
1956 77260 11.8 654070
1957 84400 12.9 654070
1959 91897 14.1 654070
1961 103580 12.4 838629
1962 116560 192 13.9 0.022 838629
1963 127318 184 15.2 0.022 838629
1964 144826 17.3 0.035 838629
1965 159620 556 19 0.066 838629
1966 160090 1026 19.1 0.12 838629
1967 112876 919 13.5 0.11 838629
1968 128764 1046 15.4 0.12 838629
1969 147300 1177 17.6 0.14 838629
1970 161390 1349 19.2 0.16 838629
1971 177223 1624 21.1 0.19 838629
1973 218173 2649 26 0.32 838629
1974 237736 3120 28.3 0.37 838629
1975 355713 3120 30.5 0.37 838629
1976 274328 3120 32.7 0.37 838629
Algeria F Enrolled # F Univ % F Total % F Univ FPop.
1954 191711 17451 4.6 0.04 4120000
1956 185024 1499 4.1 0.03 4535794
1957 4535794
1958 272575 6 4535794
1959 318692 7 4535794
1960 376617 2318 7.5 0.04 5035790
1961 392779 7.8 5035790
1962 343700 570 6.8 0.01 5035790
1963 5978349
1964 515633 1199 8.6 0.02 5978349
1965 562135 1631 9.2 0.027 6088727
1966 582306 1851 9.7 0.031 6004534
1968 649003 2398 10.8 0.04 6004534
1969 770316 3022 12.8 o.od 6004534
1971 881775 5540 14.7 0.09 6004534
1973 1075995 7028 17.9 0.12 6004534
1975 1227949 7028 20.5 0.12 6004534
1976 1352417 12171 22.5 0.2 6004534
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Comparative Statistics : Number of females enrolled in school to total female population
%F total Algeria Egypt Jordan Tunisia
1954 4.6 6.8 11.6 4.2
1955 11.8
1956 4.1 12.9 5.8




1961 7.8 9.7 12.4 9.7
1962 6.8 9.8 13.9 9.6
1963 11 15.2 12.7
1964 8.6 10.4 17.3 11.5
1965 9.2 11 19 11.7
1966 9.7 19.1 13.7
1967 11.8 13.5 15.9
1968 10.8 12.1 15.4
1969 12.8 12.6 17.6
1970 13.1 19.2 17.4
1971 14.7 13.8 21.1 18.7
1972 14.8
1973 17.9 26
1974 13.2 28.3 18.8
1975 20.5 13.8 30.5 15.6
1976 22.5 32.7 16.3
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Comparative Statistics : Number of females enrolled in university to total female
population









1962 0.01 0.09 0.022 0.024
1963 0.2 0.022 0.036
1964 0.02 0.19 0.035
1965 0.027 0.25 0.066 0.039
1966 0.031 0.12 0.055
1967 0.26 0.11 0.061
1968 0.04 0.27 0.12 0.073
1969 0.05 0.34 0.14
1970 0.39 0.16
1971 0.09 0.45 0.19 0.11
1972 0.68
1973 0.12 0.32 0.16
1974 0.66 0.37 0.22
1975 0.12 0.76 0.37 0.22
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